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Reasonable Certainty & Corpus Linguistics: Judging 
Definiteness After Nautilus & Teva 
Joseph Scott Miller 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reasonableness is not a concept of definite and unchanging content.  
Its meaning necessarily varies in the different fields of the law, 
because it is used as a convenient summary of the dominant 
considerations which control in the application of legal doctrines. 
 
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.1 
 
An invention must be capable of accurate definition, and it must be 
accurately defined, to be patentable. 
 
United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.2 
 
The Patent Act requires that a utility patent “conclude with one or 
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”3  
The Patent Act has included this requirement, known as claim 
definiteness,4 since 1870.5  The requirement’s rigors are now in ferment, 
                                                          
  Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  My thanks for helpful feedback to participants at 
the University of New Hampshire Law School’s Sixth Annual IP Scholars’ Roundtable, the Oregon 
Patent Law Association’s Fall 2016 meeting, the UGA Law School faculty, and Greg Castanias, 
Suzanne Michel, Janice Mueller, Christian Turner, and Ryan Vacca. © 2017 Joseph Scott Miller.  
 1.   273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). 
 2.   317 U.S. 228, 237 (1942).  See also Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 160 (2d 
Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.) (“A patent must be a certain guide; not a congeries of pregnant 
suggestions.”). 
 3.   35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).  Before the 2011 enactment of the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), the same requirement, in nearly identical words, 
was found at ¶ 2 of § 112.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006) (“The specification shall conclude with 
one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as his invention.”). 
 4.   See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 91 (5th ed. 2016) (“This statutory edict is known 
to patent lawyers as the claim definiteness requirement (although the statute does not use the word 
‘definite’).”). 
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having recently undergone transformative Supreme Court analysis twice 
in the space of nine months.6  The last time the Supreme Court had 
considered claim definiteness on the merits, before its 2014 and 2015 
decisions, was 1946.7 
In Nautilus, rejecting the Federal Circuit’s insoluble-ambiguity test 
as too tolerant of imprecise claim language,8 the Supreme Court held that 
“a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the 
specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to 
inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope 
of the invention.”9  This is, as the Court described it, the “proper reading 
of the statute’s clarity and precision demand.”10 
In Teva, again rejecting the Federal Circuit’s approach, the Supreme 
Court held that resolving a dispute about the best way to construe a word 
or phrase in a patent claim can involve questions of fact, as well as of 
law.11  As a result, when reviewing a trial court’s resolution of a claim 
                                                          
 5.   Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870) (requiring that “before any 
inventor or discoverer shall receive a patent for his invention or discovery . . . he shall particularly 
point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his 
invention or discovery”). 
 6.   Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig 
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
 7.   Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (invalidating a claim 
on a machine for measuring the distance from a well top to the oil surface below on the ground that 
“[t]he language of the claim . . . describes th[e] most crucial element in the ‘new’ combination in 
terms of what it will do rather than in terms of its own physical characteristics or its arrangement in 
the new combination apparatus.  We have held that a claim with such a description of a product is 
invalid as a violation of Rev. Stat. s 4888.”).  A subsequent case, Faulkner v. Gibbs, had appeared as 
if it might occasion further exploration of the analysis from Halliburton Oil, but after briefing and 
argument the Court thought otherwise.  338 U.S. 267, 267 (1949) (per curiam) (“The record, briefs 
and arguments of counsel lead us to the view that Halliburton . . . is inapposite.”). 
 8.  Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 (“To tolerate imprecision just short of that rendering a claim 
‘insolubly ambiguous’ would diminish the definiteness requirement’s public-notice function and 
foster the innovation-discouraging ‘zone of uncertainty’ against which this Court has warned.”) 
(quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)).  The Federal 
Circuit’s “insolubly ambiguous” test arose no later than 2001, with the decision in Exxon Research 
& Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“If a claim is insolubly 
ambiguous, and no narrowing construction can properly be adopted, we have held the claim 
indefinite.  If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable and 
the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the claim 
sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.”). 
 9.  Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124. 
 10.  Id. (emphasis added).  On remand, the Federal Circuit concluded, as it had before, that the 
asserted claims were not invalid for indefiniteness.  Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 
F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir.) (“On remand, we maintain our reversal of the district court’s 
determination that Biosig’s patent claims are indefinite.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 569 (2015). 
 11.  Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 838 (“While we held in Markman that the ultimate issue of the proper 
construction of a claim should be treated as a question of law, we also recognized that in patent 
construction, subsidiary factfinding is sometimes necessary.  Indeed, we referred to claim 
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construction dispute, an appeals court must apply the standard of review 
for factual findings, setting them aside only if they are “clearly 
erroneous.”12  The problem with the claim term at issue in Teva—
“molecular weight”—was, importantly, purported indefiniteness: 
accused infringer Sandoz “argued . . . that, in the context of th[e asserted] 
patent claim, the term ‘molecular weight’ might mean any one of three 
different things.”13  Depending on which meaning was established, 
infringement may or may not occur, presenting just the type of claim 
scope uncertainty condemned in Nautilus.  And the definiteness question 
turned on disputed facts: “[T]his case provides a perfect example of the 
factfinding that sometimes underlies claim construction.”14  The trial 
court received testimony from conflicting experts, credited the patentee’s 
expert over the accused infringer’s, and made a factual finding about 
how the person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the 
term “molecular weight”; that finding, in turn, informed the trial court’s 
construction of the term in the context of the asserted patent.15  The 
appeals court rejected the trial court’s finding without analyzing whether 
                                                          
construction as a practice with ‘evidentiary underpinnings,’ a practice that ‘falls somewhere between 
a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact.’  We added that sometimes courts may have to 
make ‘credibility judgments’ about witnesses.  In other words, we recognized that courts may have 
to resolve subsidiary factual disputes.”) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 
370, 378, 388, 390, 389 (1996)). 
  Teva thus put to rest an issue that had divided the Federal Circuit for almost twenty years.  
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Supreme Court rejected the patentee’s contention that 
it had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury verdict on the claim construction dispute in the case.  
517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (“We hold that the construction of a patent, including terms of art within 
its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”).  In the wake of that decision, the Federal 
Circuit reviewed claim construction decisions de novo on appeal.  See MUELLER, supra note 4, at 
645–59 (discussing this line of cases).  But the Federal Circuit remained internally divided on the 
proper standard of review for claim construction, leading to two split en banc cases on the practice in 
the years between Markman and Teva.  See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. 
Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (reaffirming de novo review of claim construction 
by a 6-4 vote); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(reaffirming de novo review of claim construction by 9-3 vote).  Teva’s holding on the factual 
underpinnings of claim construction is still rippling through the patent system.  That process is a 
slow one.  See Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 430, 432 (2015) (“It seems to be business as usual at the Federal Circuit.”). 
 12.   Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 836; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based 
on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court 
must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”). 
 13.   Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 836.  The trial court had concluded that the claim was not fatally 
indefinite.  Id.  The Federal Circuit disagreed, striking down the claim as indefinite.  Id.  The 
procedural facet of the case the Supreme Court squarely rejected was that “the Federal Circuit 
reviewed de novo all aspects of the District Court’s claim construction, including the District Court’s 
determination of subsidiary facts.”  Id.  
 14.   Id. at 840. 
 15.   Id. at 842–43. 
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it was clearly erroneous, and “in failing to do so, the Federal Circuit was 
wrong.”16 
The Federal Circuit has also recently tackled a claim-definiteness 
question in a different part of the patent system, reviewing the way the 
Patent Office implements the clarity requirement during the initial 
examination of a patent application.17  One key difference between patent 
examination and patent litigation is that, in the former process, an 
applicant can fix a legal defect in imprecise claim language simply by 
amending that claim language.18  By contrast, in an enforcement case 
such as Nautilus and Teva, the terms in an issued patent claim remain 
fixed: However badly bungled the claim language may be, a court cannot 
rewrite the claim to save it.19  In In re Packard, a case of first impression 
handed down about a month before the Supreme Court’s Nautilus 
decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed that, 
when the USPTO has initially issued a well-grounded rejection that 
                                                          
 16.   Id. at 843.  On remand, the Federal Circuit concluded, as it had before, that the asserted 
claims were invalid for indefiniteness.  Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 17.   See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2012) (“The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the 
application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant is 
entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent therefor.”). 
 18.   See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M–I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“We note that the patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, 
and it is highly desirable that patent examiners demand that applicants do so in appropriate 
circumstances so that the patent can be amended during prosecution rather than attempting to resolve 
the ambiguity in litigation.”). 
 19.   See Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“This 
court . . . repeatedly and consistently has recognized that courts may not redraft claims, whether to 
make them operable or to sustain their validity.”); Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (“We . . . have consistently employed the caveat, ‘if possible,’ to our instruction that 
claims should be construed to sustain their validity.  We have also admonished against judicial 
rewriting of claims to preserve validity.”) (citations omitted).  As the Supreme Court cautioned 130 
years ago, 
[s]ome persons seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax, which may 
be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to 
make it include something more than, or something different from, what its words 
express.  The context may, undoubtedly, be resorted to, and often is resorted to, for the 
purpose of better understanding the meaning of the claim; but not for the purpose of 
changing it, and making it different from what it is.  The claim is a statutory requirement, 
prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his 
invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it 
in a manner different from the plain import of its terms. 
White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1886); see also Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Am. Fur Ref. Co., 
198 U.S. 399, 410 (1905) (“In making his claim the inventor is at liberty to choose his own form of 
expression, and while the courts may construe the same in view of the specifications and the state of 
the art, they may not add to or detract from the claim.”).  More concisely: “The claim is the measure 
of the grant.”  Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944). 
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identifies ways in which language in a claim is ambiguous, vague, 
incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the 
claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant fails to provide a 
satisfactory response, the USPTO can properly reject the claim as 
failing to meet the statutory [definiteness] requirements of § 112(b).20 
A “satisfactory response” from the would-be patentee can be “a 
modification of the language identified as unclear, a separate definition 
of the unclear language, or, in an appropriate case, a persuasive 
explanation for the record of why the language at issue is not actually 
unclear.”21  In explaining its approach, the Federal Circuit couched the 
definiteness requirement in terms remarkably similar to those the 
Supreme Court would later use in Nautilus: “[T]his requirement is not a 
demand for unreasonable precision. . . . Rather, how much clarity is 
required necessarily invokes some standard of reasonable precision in 
the use of language in the context of the circumstances.”22 
Nautilus rejects the lax definiteness test the Federal Circuit had used 
since at least 2001, instead requiring that a claim provide reasonably 
certain notice.23  Teva rejects the claim construction plenary-review 
paradigm the Federal Circuit had used since 1996, instead treating claim 
construction as grounded as much in technological fact as in 
documentary law.24  Packard fully endorses a definiteness inquiry at the 
Patent Office that demands more of applicants who proffer seemingly 
unclear claims.25 
As the Patent Office, the courts, patent applicants, and litigants 
adjust to this new reality, a critical question looms: What constitutes the 
requisite “reasonable certainty” that Nautilus demands?  Put differently, 
how, exactly, is one to establish—in the Patent Office, or in the courts—
whether a disputed claim term provides reasonably certain notice?  After 
all, the term “‘[r]easonable,’ the most ubiquitous legal adjective, is not 
self-defining.”26  The Federal Circuit, in its remand decision in Nautilus, 
                                                          
 20.   751 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015). 
 21.   Id. 
 22.   Id. at 1313 (emphasis added).  The Packard court’s reference to context is also reminiscent 
of the court’s conclusion, in an earlier era, that definiteness is a function of the technological art to 
which the invention pertains.  See Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 
1568, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (upholding the definiteness of “[t]he phrase ‘so dimensioned’” in a 
claim reciting a pediatric wheelchair designed to be put in a car, on the ground that the phrase “is as 
accurate as the subject matter permits, automobiles being of various sizes”). 
 23.   See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129–30 (2014). 
 24.   See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). 
 25.   See Packard, 751 F.3d at 1313–14. 
 26.   Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1530 
(1982).  As Professor David Zaring recently observed, in analyzing the best way to conceptualize 
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recognized this breadth, observing that “[r]easonableness is the core of 
much of the common law, and ‘reasonable certainty’ has been defined in 
broad spectra of the law.”27 
Reasonableness is a function of context.  The context here is marking 
claim scope, using well-chosen, well-arranged words and phrases to 
establish a boundary that people skilled in the relevant art can identify 
and thus respect (or fairly be held to account if they trespass).  Nautilus 
mediates between dysfunctional extremes—a demand for perfect clarity 
that language cannot achieve, and a disregard for public notice that the 
statute forbids—using reasonable certainty.28  This mediating role is a 
conventional one for legal reasonableness.29  In addition, “patent law is 
                                                          
judicial review of administrative-agency action,  
[r]easonableness works all over the legal system. It undergirds the law of negligence, 
which depends upon the “reasonable person” standard; the Fourth Amendment, which 
prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures”; antitrust law, which turns ever more 
increasingly on a “rule of reason” used to evaluate restraints upon trade; securities law; 
contract law; and the list could go on. 
David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 527 (2011); see also George P. 
Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 949 (1985) (“W[e] lawyers should 
listen to the way we talk. . . .  One of the most striking particularities of our discourse is its pervasive 
reliance on the term ‘reasonable.’  We routinely refer to reasonable time, reasonable delay, 
reasonable reliance, and reasonable care.  In criminal law, we talk incessantly of reasonable 
provocation, reasonable mistake, reasonable force, and reasonable risk.  Within these idioms pulse 
the sensibilities of the reasonable person.  For all the supposed concreteness of the common law, we 
can hardly function without this hypothetical figure at the center of legal debate.  We cannot even 
begin to argue about most issues of responsibility and liability without first asking what a 
hypothetical reasonable person would do under the circumstances.”) (citation omitted). 
 27.   Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 569 (2015). 
 28.   See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2128–29 (discussing these improper poles); see also id. at 2129 
(“To determine the proper office of the definiteness command, therefore, we must reconcile 
concerns that tug in opposite directions.”). 
 29.   “Reasonableness can thus be conceived as [a] quest for a practical equilibrium, in an 
attempt to bring into balance different normative possibilities, measures, and arguments in relation to 
different circumstances.”  REASONABLENESS AND LAW xi (Giorgio Bongiovanni et al. eds., 2009); 
see also Neil MacCormick, Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1575, 1579 
(1999) (“The reasonable person has the virtue of prudentia and uses this in action. It is a virtue that is 
incompatible with fanaticism or apathy, but holds a mean between these, as it does between 
excessive caution and excessive indifference to risk.”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness in 
and out of Negligence Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2138 (2015) (“Frequently in the law, 
reasonableness is utilized to qualify prices, rates, and costs.  It is often used to qualify ‘time,’ as in 
‘within a reasonable time.’  In all of these cases, ‘reasonable’ is roughly the opposite of 
‘excessive.’”) (footnote omitted).  Relatedly, we can use “reasonable” to highlight that a 
characteristic exists along a continuum, rather than only at one of two extremes:  
Not only do the[] qualifiers [“reasonable” and “reasonably”] ensure that it is a moderate 
level of the quality being designated, they also ensure that the one applying the law (be it 
legal actor or judge) is being guided in a manner that requires the exercise of judgment, 
not simply the identification of a clear-cut attribute.   
Id. at 2146. 
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‘a field where so much depends upon familiarity with specific scientific 
problems and principles not usually contained in the general storehouse 
of knowledge and experience.’”30  As a result, to determine whether a 
patentee has marked out a reasonably certain boundary, one must have a 
firm grasp of the full range of language usage options that were available 
to a claim drafter in the relevant technological art at the time the patent in 
question was filed.  For unless one establishes the usage options from 
among which such artisans demonstrably could have chosen as means to 
the end of “inform[ing] those skilled in the art about the scope of the 
invention with reasonable certainty,”31 one is not in a position to judge 
fairly the propriety of the means a given patentee actually did choose to 
that end.  The upshot of the transformation Nautilus and Teva have 
wrought, then, is that we need much more usage-facts grist for the 
definiteness-inquiry mill, relative to current practice. 
This paper examines new ways the Patent Office and the courts can 
reliably obtain, organize, and bring to bear a robust, orderly factual 
record on usage patterns in a given technological art at the time a patent 
is, or was, filed.  Usage patterns in prior art English-language32 patents, 
the focus of this paper, would provide the most highly relevant data.  
Treating all prior art U.S. patents (or perhaps all prior art English 
language patents) as texts in a single corpus for computer-based analysis, 
the patent system can use the tools of corpus linguistics—“the aim [of 
which is] the analysis and description of language use, as realised in 
text(s)”33—to establish an art’s prevailing usage patterns as of a given 
date.  By processing a large collection of texts digitally, corpus 
linguistics simply lets us achieve a much-needed level of rigor and 
reliability in our conclusions about language usage—conclusions of the 
sort we make informally, and virtually instantaneously, every day as 
native speakers of a language.34  The rigorously demonstrable usage 
                                                          
 30.   Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015) (quoting Graver Tank 
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950)). 
 31.   Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129. 
 32.   Applications for U.S. utility patents must be in English.  37 C.F.R. § 1.52(b)(1)(ii), (d)(1) 
(2016). 
 33.   Elena Tognini Bonelli, Theoretical Overview of the Evolution of Corpus Linguistics, in 
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 14, 18–19 (Anne O’Keefe & Michael 
McCarthy eds., 2010); see also TONY MCENERY & ANDREW HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: 
METHOD, THEORY AND PRACTICE 1–2 (2012) (“We could reasonably define corpus linguistics as 
dealing with some set of machine-readable texts which is deemed an appropriate basis on which to 
study a specific set of research questions.  The set of texts or corpus dealt with is usually of a size 
which defies analysis by hand and eye alone within any reasonable timeframe.”). 
 34.   Utah Supreme Court Associate Chief Justice Thomas Lee recently explained this in a 
concurring opinion in a case that turned on the best construction of a state criminal statute: 
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patterns established by corpus linguistics, however, can provide the 
proper evidentiary foundation for judging claim definiteness objectively. 
Because patent examination and patent litigation shape and process 
inputs differently, with different consequences, one needs to consider 
these settings individually.  This paper does that.  What is true across the 
board is that the patentee is ultimately responsible for claim definiteness 
as the author of the claim language, both as a claim is presented in the 
originally filed application35 and as a claim is amended in the course of 
patent examination.36  The patentee’s responsibility for the claim 
language has important implications for the process of proof in resolving 
a claim definiteness challenge, as the Federal Circuit’s Packard decision 
indicates.37  To point to the most salient analogy in recent Supreme Court 
patent jurisprudence: The patentee’s ultimate responsibility for the 
chosen claim language shaped the new proof process for nonliteral 
infringement that the Supreme Court created in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.38  Festo’s focus on the patentee as the 
actor most accountable for chosen claim language echoes strongly in the 
Court’s analysis of claim definiteness in Nautilus.  To reliably implement 
the new Nautilus “reasonable certainty” standard, then, it is best to begin 
with Festo. 
                                                          
  In this age of information, we have ready access to means for testing our resolution of 
linguistic ambiguity.  Instead of just relying on the limited capacities of the dictionary or 
our memory, we can access large bodies of real-world language to see how particular 
words or phrases are actually used in written or spoken English.  Linguists have a name 
for this kind of analysis; it is known as corpus linguistics. 
  The fancy Latin name makes this enterprise seem esoteric and daunting. It is not.  We 
all engage in it even if we don’t attach the technical label to it.  A corpus is a body, and 
corpus linguistics analysis is no more than a study of language employing a body of 
language.  When we communicate using words we naturally access a large corpus—the 
body of language we have been exposed to during our lifetimes—to decode the groups of 
letters or sounds we encounter.  The most basic corpus linguistics analysis involves our 
split-second effort to access the body of language in our heads in our ongoing attempt to 
decode words or phrases we may be uncertain of.  We all do that repeatedly every day. 
State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 57–58, 356 P.3d 1258 (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted). 
 35.   See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.51(b)(1), 1.75 (2016). 
 36.   See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2012); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111(c), 1.121(c) (2016). 
 37.   See In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Given the role of the applicant 
in the process, it is a reasonable implementation of the examination responsibility, as applied to § 
112(b), for the USPTO, upon providing the applicant a well-grounded identification of clarity 
problems, to demand persuasive responses on pain of rejection.  That approach decides this case, 
because Mr. Packard did not offer a satisfactory response to well-grounded indefiniteness rejections 
in this case.”). 
 38.   See 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002) (“The patentee, as the author of the claim language, may be 
expected to draft claims encompassing readily known equivalents.”) (emphasis added). 
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II. SCOUTING THE NEW TERRAIN 
To establish the scope of one’s patent claim with reasonable 
certainty, the patent writer must both select apt terms and arrange those 
terms well.  The quality of selection and arrangement depends, in part, 
on the options the patent writer has available in the commonly accepted 
terminology in one’s art at the time one writes the claims and the 
disclosure that supports them.39  In this sense, the stock of familiar 
vocabulary and common usage in art A at time T—a matter of fact, as 
Teva establishes40—is the backdrop for one’s claim-drafting choices.  
Those commonly accepted words and phrases are also the point of 
departure for considering whether a gap between the nature of one’s new 
invention and familiar terms’ settled meanings requires one to craft a 
bespoke definition of one’s own for a given claim term.  A semantic gap 
of this sort, if it occurs, is hardly surprising: “The dictionary does not 
always keep abreast of the inventor.  It cannot.  Things are not made for 
the sake of words, but words for things.”41  This freedom to provide an 
explicit definition for a claim term—to be, as the cases say, one’s “own 
lexicographer”42—is open to all patentees. 
To claim, then, is to choose.  The patentee chooses for the claim 
those words and phrases that best establish the full scope of the 
invention.  The patentee further chooses whether to rely on the ordinary 
meaning that is known in the art or, instead, to specially define any of 
                                                          
 39.   Another key determinant, of course, is the explanatory support the patent writer provides 
in the disclosure that supports the claims—disclosure that can set forth express definitions for claim 
terms, working or prophetic examples of the claimed invention, and drawings.  See MUELLER, supra 
note 4, at 91–92, 151–58 (describing these features of a patent’s supporting disclosure, or 
“specification”).  The PTO’s regulation on the basic content of a patent document, including the 
disclosure that supports the claims, is set forth at 37 C.F.R. § 1.51(b) (2016). 
 40.   See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 842–43 (2015) (discussing the 
trial record on the meaning of “molecular weight” in a given piece of art at a given time). 
 41.   Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
 42.   See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (quoting 
Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); Vitronics 
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Although words in a claim are 
generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, a patentee may choose to be his own 
lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning . . . .”); Autogiro, 384 
F.2d at 397 (“To overcome this lag, patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer.”).  
The judicial phrase, if not the principle, seems to originate from a 1921 decision of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  See Advance Rumley Co. v. John Lauson Mfg. Co., 275 F. 249, 
251 (7th Cir. 1921) (“This court has frequently and consistently recognized the patentee’s right to be 
his own lexicographer . . . .”).  “Lexicographer” is simply a posh word for “an author or compiler of 
a dictionary.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1301 (1966).  Importantly, “[i]n such 
cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.”  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (en banc). 
48 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
those claim words or phrases, setting forth the definition(s) in the 
supporting written disclosure.  (Of course, a patentee who mistakenly 
believes a given term to have a settled meaning to the ordinary artisan 
may fail to provide a bespoke definition when, in truth, the ordinary 
artisan would need a definition to take the meaning the patentee intends.)  
And the patentee’s choices are consequential.  As the Supreme Court 
made clear more than a decade ago in Festo, the patent system requires 
the patentee, not the broader public, to shoulder the cost of uncertainty 
that arises from those claim drafting choices.43  This basic demand on the 
patentee, established in Festo, frames the prudent reading of Nautilus and 
Teva. 
A. The Festo Spirit 
Patent infringement is a type of trespass: If one makes, uses, sells, 
offers to sell, or imports the invention claimed in a utility patent, one 
directly infringes that claim.44  Importantly, as a matter of judge-made 
law since the 1850s, one can infringe a claim even if the accused item 
does not meet every claim limitation literally.  So long as the limitation 
that is missing literally is present equivalently, i.e., by way of an 
insubstantially different substitute, the accused item triggers liability.45 
In Festo, its most recent decision on equivalent infringement, the 
Supreme Court justified this departure from the strictures of literal claim 
scope—and the increased uncertainty that this departure inevitably 
creates—as the unavoidable price we pay for making patents sufficiently 
attractive rewards to induce inventors to apply for them.  Taking as a 
given that a patent “is a property right,” and thus, “like any property 
right, its boundaries should be clear,” the Court could not help but 
acknowledge that, “[u]nfortunately, the nature of language makes it 
impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application.”46 At 
the same time, “[i]f patents were always interpreted by their literal terms 
[alone], their value would be greatly diminished.”47  The solution has 
long been, the Court held, to extend the patentee’s exclusion right: “The 
                                                          
 43.   See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002) 
(noting that the burden is on the patentee “to draft claims encompassing readily known 
equivalents”). 
 44.   See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (defining utility-patent infringement); MUELLER, supra note 
4, at 661–63 (describing literal patent infringement). 
 45.   See MUELLER, supra note 4, at 663–72 (describing infringement under “the doctrine of 
equivalents,” as well as the insubstantial-difference standard of equivalency). 
 46.   Festo, 535 U.S. at 730–31. 
 47.   Id. at 731. 
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scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all 
equivalents to the claims described.”48 That the “doctrine of equivalents 
renders the scope of patents less certain,” while regrettable, is “the price 
of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation.”49 
Equivalent infringement is not, however, a license to engage in a 
freewheeling infringement analysis that is heedless of the particular way 
the patentee wrote the claim and navigated Patent Office review.  First, 
“the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the 
claim, not to the invention as a whole.”50  Every claim limitation the 
patentee chose to recite is significant.  Second, if the patentee obtained 
the claim from the Patent Office only by narrowing its initial scope to 
overcome a legal hurdle, that narrowing amendment stops the patentee 
from relying on the doctrine of equivalents to recapture the sacrificed 
scope as if the amendment had not occurred.  This constraint on 
equivalent infringement, known as “prosecution history estoppel,” was 
the very constraint at issue in Festo.51  Specifically, the Court confronted 
a challenge to the Federal Circuit’s conclusion “that when estoppel 
arises, it bars suit against every equivalent to the amended claim 
element.”52  The Federal Circuit, for its part, had tired of the 
unpredictability of crafting individually tailored estoppels based on the 
particulars of each case, concluding that its longstanding “case-by-case 
approach ha[d] proved unworkable.”53 
The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s complete-bar rule, 
on the ground that a complete bar imprudently demands perfection in 
language, in just the same way that a literal-infringement-only approach 
would demand perfection.  The very existence of the doctrine of 
equivalents recognizes language’s imperfection, and so, in turn, must 
prosecution history estoppel recognize it.  At the same time, it is true that 
this estoppel, even as it fully respects the shortcomings of language, 
targets a case where the patentee had not lacked for the requisite phrasing 
but instead chose narrower words advisedly: 
Where the original application once embraced the purported equivalent 
but the patentee narrowed his claims to obtain the patent or to protect 
its validity, the patentee cannot assert that he lacked the words to 
describe the subject matter in question. . . . In that instance the 
                                                          
 48.   Id. at 732 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1854)). 
 49.   Id. 
 50.   Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
 51.   See 535 U.S. at 733–34. 
 52.   Id. at 727. 
 53.   Id. at 730. 
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prosecution history has established that the inventor turned his 
attention to the subject matter in question, knew the words for both the 
broader and narrower claim, and affirmatively chose the latter.54 
Treating every estoppel as a complete foreclosure of equivalents, by 
contrast, would effectively deny the axiom that language captures an 
invention’s essence only imperfectly: 
By amending the application, the inventor is deemed to concede that 
the patent does not extend as far as the original claim.  It does not 
follow, however, that the amended claim becomes so perfect in its 
description that no one could devise an equivalent.  After amendment, 
as before, language remains an imperfect fit for invention.55 
As a result, “there is no more reason for holding the patentee to the literal 
terms of an amended claim than there is for . . . holding every patentee to 
the literal terms of the patent.”56  The Federal Circuit’s absolute bar 
could not stand. 
Just as clearly, however, the Supreme Court opted against a 
simplistic return to the unworkable status quo ante that, in the Federal 
Circuit’s view, had “l[ed] to excessive uncertainty and burden[ed] 
legitimate innovation.”57  Specifically, adapting a strategy it had used in 
an equivalents case just five years earlier,58 the Court restructured the 
process of proof by creating a new rebuttable “presumption that 
prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence.”59  If the 
patentee secured the asserted claim from the Patent Office only by 
amending the claim’s text to narrow its scope, thus sacrificing coverage, 
the patentee should bear the burden of showing that the amendment 
does not surrender the particular equivalent in question. . . . The 
patentee, as the author of the claim language, may be expected to draft 
                                                          
 54.   Id. at 734–35 (emphasis added); see also id. at 737–38 (“[T]he purpose of applying the 
estoppel in the first place [is] to hold the inventor to the representations made during the application 
process and to the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment.”). 
 55.   Id. at 738 (emphasis added). 
 56.   Id. 
 57.   Id. at 737. 
 58.   See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997) (“In our 
view, holding that certain reasons for a claim amendment may avoid the application of prosecution 
history estoppel is not tantamount to holding that the absence of a reason for an amendment may 
similarly avoid such an estoppel.  Mindful that claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a 
notice function, we think the better rule is to place the burden on the patent holder to establish the 
reason for an amendment required during patent prosecution. . . . Where no explanation is 
established, however, the court should presume that the patent applicant had a substantial reason 
related to patentability for including the limiting element added by amendment.”). 
 59.   Festo, 535 U.S. at 741. 
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claims encompassing readily known equivalents.  A patentee’s decision 
to narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a 
general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the 
amended claim.60 
The patentee, rather than the accused infringer (or, more generally, the 
public), thus bears the immediate cost of the uncertainty that the claim 
scope change produces.  Of course, the patentee has the opportunity to 
rebut the presumption that it surrendered the scope it now seeks to 
enforce.  To do so, “[t]he patentee must show that at the time of the 
amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to 
have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged 
equivalent.”61  We thus look to the choices a skilled patentee could have 
made, to judge the quality of the choice this specific patentee did make.  
In particular, the patentee can excuse his or her failure to have recited 
(literally) the scope it now seeks (equivalently) by showing that the 
equivalent was “unforeseeable at the time of the application.”62 
By directing this new presumption against the patentee and 
prescribing means for rebutting it, the Court underscored the need to 
keep uncertainty costs closely tethered to the patentee’s specific claim 
language choices.  Patentees doubtless grumbled, in the wake of Festo, 
that it is difficult to make such pivotal choices about claim language 
before all the market consequences of the choice are apparent.  But of 
course the gravity of the choices, and prudently allocating the cost of 
mistaken choices, is precisely the point: The flexibility the law affords, 
with doctrines such as equivalent infringement, is rooted in reasonably 
unavoidable imperfections, not studied, self-serving equivocations.  The 
spirit of Festo is that a patentee has no right to use avoidably uncertain 
claim language (to preserve post hoc enforcement flexibility) that the 
patent system is bound to respect. 
                                                          
 60.   Id. at 740 (emphases added). 
 61.   Id. at 741 (emphasis added).  Note the use of “reasonably”: We neither demand perfection 
nor accept sloth. 
 62.   Id. at 740.  Foreseeability thus helps limit the duty to a reasonable scope, much as it does 
in negligence.  See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 159 (2d ed. 2016) 
(“[F]oreseeability of harm, though not sufficient, is necessary to show negligence.  No actor can be 
counted as negligent unless he either actually foresaw, or a reasonable person in a similar position 
would have foreseen that harm to someone’s interests was an unreasonably likely outcome of his 
conduct.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care 
under all the circumstances.  Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s 
conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in 
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”). 
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B. The Nautilus Standard 
The issue in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.63—the proper 
standard for judging claim definiteness, which is a validity doctrine—
was different from the issue in Festo—the scope of prosecution history 
estoppel, which is an infringement doctrine.  But the Court analyzed the 
Nautilus issue in terms remarkably similar to the Festo issue.  Indeed, 
Festo was the very first decision the Nautilus Court cited.64 
The patent claim in dispute in the case recited a heart-rate monitor in 
the form of a handle for exercise equipment, such as a treadmill.65  The 
disputed claim term, which pertained to a set of detection electrodes 
arrayed on the handle, required that the electrodes be “in spaced 
relationship with each other.”66  But the claim did not specify further just 
what that “spaced relationship” was, either in absolute numerical terms 
or in relative terms.67  The trial court had found the claim limitation 
indefinite, and a Federal Circuit panel—applying the quite patentee-
forgiving, uncertainty-tolerant “insolubly ambiguous” standard—had 
reversed that judgment.68  The Supreme Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit standard, although it did not go further to apply the new 
standard—”inform[ing] with reasonable certainty”—to the disputed 
claim language in the case.69 
As the Court noted, several settled claim construction principles 
were common ground among the parties: One assesses claim definiteness 
“from the perspective of someone skilled in the relevant art,” not from 
the point of view of a generalist judge or juror; and in assessing claim 
clarity, one construes the claim language “in light of the patent’s 
specification and prosecution history.”70  But how to resolve the parties’ 
competing contentions about the level of clarity the Patent Act demands? 
The Court framed the inquiry as a matter of balancing the critical 
need for clarity against the stubborn reality of language’s imperfections.  
And in doing so, it drew directly from Festo.  “On the one hand, the 
definiteness requirement must take into account the inherent limitations 
                                                          
 63.   134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
 64.   Id. at 2124 (“‘Th[at] monopoly is a property right,’ and ‘like any property right, its 
boundaries should be clear.’”) (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 730). 
 65.   Id. at 2122. 
 66.   Id. 
 67.   See id. at 2127. 
 68.   Id. at 2127–28. 
 69.   Id. at 2131. 
 70.   Id. at 2128. 
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of language.  Some modicum of uncertainty, the Court has recognized, is 
the ‘price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation.’”71  On 
the other hand, however, “a patent must be precise enough to afford clear 
notice of what is claimed . . . [o]therwise there would be ‘[a] zone of 
uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the 
risk of infringement claims.’”72  Faced with this unavoidable tension 
between the need for clarity and the ineliminable imprecision of 
language, the Court described its task as “reconcil[ing] concerns that tug 
in opposite directions.”73 
The reconciling construct the Court chose is reasonably certain 
notice.  The Court read § 112 of the Patent Act “to require that a patent’s 
claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, 
inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with 
reasonable certainty.”74  By settling on reasonableness, thereby 
moderating between extremes,75 the Court “mandate[d] clarity, while 
recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable.”76  We can, in turn, 
satisfy this mandate for reasonable clarity with verifiable data about the 
language usage of those skilled in the relevant art at the relevant time.77  
Just as we did in Festo, here again we look to the choices a skilled 
patentee could have made to judge the quality of the choice this specific 
patentee did make. 
Admittedly, the Nautilus case does not fully set forth a process of 
proof for establishing or assessing such a factual foundation about 
language usage.  It does, however, point strongly to a presumption 
framework that focuses on the patentee, familiar from Festo.  In 
particular, the Court couched the clear-notice imperative as an important 
structural response to a patentee’s basic incentive to retain vague claim 
language if possible: 
And absent a meaningful definiteness check, we are told, patent 
applicants face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into their 
claims.  See Brief for Petitioner 30–32 (citing patent treatises and 
drafting guides).  See also Federal Trade Commission, The Evolving IP 
                                                          
 71.   Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 732). 
 72.   Id. at 2129 (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 
(1942)). 
 73.   Id. 
 74.   Id. 
 75.   See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 76.   Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129. 
 77.   Usage at the time the patent was written and filed is key: “[T]he definiteness inquiry trains 
on the understanding of a skilled artisan at the time of the patent application, not that of a court 
viewing matters post hoc.”  Id. at 2130. 
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Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies With Competition 
85 (2011) (quoting testimony that patent system fosters “an incentive to 
be as vague and ambiguous as you can with your claims” and “defer 
clarity at all costs”).  Eliminating that temptation is in order, and “the 
patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in . . . 
patent claims.”  Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M–I LLC, 514 F.3d 
1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  See also Hormone Research Foundation, 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It is a 
well-established axiom in patent law that a patentee is free to be his or 
her own lexicographer . . . .”).78 
The echo from Festo is unmistakable: The patentee captains the claims, 
and it is thus fair to keep on the patentee’s side of the ledger the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of the patentee’s own claim 
drafting choices.  Equally vital is the Court’s explicit recognition, 
quoting Hormone Research, that every patentee can set forth a claim 
boundary not only by using the familiar words or phrases established in 
the art, but also by inventing new words—or, more likely, new 
definitions for existing words—if that is what the patentee thinks is best 
under the circumstances.  There is, as a result, simply no basis at all for 
indulging the patentee’s “temptation” to “inject ambiguity into [his or 
her] claims.”79 
At the time the Court decided Nautilus, the Federal Circuit remained 
internally divided over the question whether claim construction entailed 
findings of fact that were entitled to deferential review on appeal.80  In 
January 2015, in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,81 the 
Court turned to that question. 
C. The Teva Determination 
The Court’s 1996 decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 
put to rest the contention that the Seventh Amendment’s jury-trial right 
required that juries answer claim construction questions—it does not.82  
What Markman left open, however, was the appellate standard of review 
for district court claim construction rulings.  In Teva—a case, like 
Nautilus, centered on an indefiniteness challenge to a patent asserted in 
                                                          
 78.   Id. at 2129 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). 
 79.   Id. 
 80.   See supra note 11 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s post-Markman en banc cases on the 
standard of review for claim construction determinations). 
 81.   135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
 82.   517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (“We hold that the construction of a patent, including terms of 
art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”). 
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litigation—the Court held that the “clearly erroneous” standard in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) “appl[ies] when a court of 
appeals reviews a district court’s resolution of subsidiary factual matters 
made in the course of its construction of a patent claim.”83 
The Court further held that the ultimate construction of a disputed 
claim term is a legal question, subject to plenary review on appeal, 
setting up a two-step hybrid standard: “The district judge, after deciding 
the factual dispute, will then interpret the patent claim in light of the facts 
as he has found them.  This ultimate interpretation is a legal conclusion.  
The appellate court can still review the district court’s ultimate 
construction of the claim de novo.”84 
Not all claim construction disputes will involve subsidiary fact 
disputes: “We recognize that a district court’s construction of a patent 
claim . . . often requires the judge only to examine and to construe the 
document’s words without requiring the judge to resolve any underlying 
factual disputes.”85  On the other hand, “[i]n some cases . . . the district 
court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence and to 
consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the 
background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during 
the relevant time period.”86  What’s more, “in some instances, a factual 
finding may be close to dispositive of the ultimate legal question of the 
proper meaning of the term in the context of the patent.”87  The 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence that the Court 
flagged, which has become a core fixture of the post-Markman era,88 
helps one discern the way that Teva highlights all the resources that are 
available in the “reasonable certainty” inquiry that Nautilus mandates.  
Those resources include extrinsic evidence about the meaning of a term 
in art A at time T, an evidentiary category about semantic usage within 
which corpus linguistics data comfortably fall. 
                                                          
 83.   Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 836. 
 84.   Id. at 841.  The Court framed that ultimate legal question this way: “whether a skilled 
artisan would ascribe that same meaning to that term in the context of the specific patent claim under 
review.”  Id.  
 85.   Id. at 840–41. 
 86.   Id. at 841 (emphases added). 
 87.   Id. at 841–42. 
 88.   See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314–19, 1321–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(describing the variety and weight of intrinsic and extrinsic sources for construing disputed claim 
terms); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (same); see 
also MUELLER, supra note 4, at 636–38 (summarizing the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction).  The 
Federal Judicial Center’s Patent Case Management Judicial Guide, canvassing twenty years of 
practice, provides a concise chart of the major intrinsic and extrinsic sources.  PETER S. MENELL ET 
AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 5-36 (3d ed. 2016) (specifically Chart 5.1). 
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The facts of Teva make the point.  In Nautilus, the parties had 
focused on intrinsic sources.89  In Teva, by contrast, the parties relied 
heavily on extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony.90  To be 
sure, the dispute in Teva about which of the three possible meanings to 
choose for the claim term “molecular weight”91 had a critical intrinsic 
hook in the patent’s written disclosure—namely, the measurement data 
depicted in figure 1 of the patent: 
 Teva argued . . . that the term “molecular weight” in the patent 
meant molecular calculated in the first way . . . .  Sandoz, however, 
argued that figure 1 of the patent showed that Teva could not be right 
 . . . That figure, said Sandoz, helped to show that the patent term did 
not refer to the first method of calculation.92 
But the dispute over the figure’s meaning spilled out into a dispute 
between the parties’ conflicting experts: 
Teva’s expert testified that a skilled artisan would understand that 
converting data from a chromatogram to molecular weight distribution 
curves like those in figure 1 would cause the peak on each curve to 
shift slightly; this could explain the difference between the value 
indicated by the peak of the curve (about 6.8) and the value in the 
figure’s legend (7.7).  Sandoz’s expert testified that no such shift would 
occur.  The District Court credited Teva’s expert’s account, thereby 
rejecting Sandoz’s expert’s explanation.  The District Court’s finding 
about this matter was a factual finding—about how a skilled artisan 
would understand the way in which a curve created from chro-
matogram data reflects molecular weights.  Based on that factual 
finding, the District Court reached the legal conclusion that figure 1 did 
not undermine Teva’s argument that molecular weight referred to the 
first method of calculation (peak average molecular weight).93 
The disputed portion of the patent may have been a chromatogram, rather 
than solely a word or phrase, but the extrinsic evidence was important 
                                                          
 89.   See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2127, 2131 (2014) 
(reviewing parties’ arguments about intrinsic materials); Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 
783 F.3d 1374, 1382, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (deciding, on remand, to “revisit the intrinsic evidence 
here to make clear that a skilled artisan would understand with reasonable certainty the scope of the 
invention,” and concluding that “[i]n this case, a skilled artisan would understand the inherent 
parameters of the invention as provided in the intrinsic evidence”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 569 
(2015). 
 90.   See Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 843. 
 91.   Id. at 836, 842 (describing the three possible meanings of this claim term). 
 92.   Id. at 842.  The figure itself is in an Appendix to the majority’s opinion.  Id. at 844. 
 93.   Id. at 843 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 
Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing, on remand, extrinsic evidence about 
figure 1). 
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because it helped answer a question about meaning, about semantic 
usage (in the relevant art at the relevant time). 
Of course, an expert witness may “testify in the form of an opinion” 
only if, among other things, “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or 
data.”94  The materials on which an expert witness relies to form opinions 
about the meaning of a claim term can also form the basis for a 
technology tutorial at the claim construction stage of enforcement 
litigation,95 which has increasingly become the stage for adjudicating 
indefiniteness issues as well.96  In any event, the objective basis for the 
opinion about semantic usage is critical: “an expert’s subjective 
understanding of a patent term is irrelevant.”97  To gain any traction in a 
claim construction dispute, an expert witness must ground his or her 
opinion about usage and meaning in the relevant art with independent 
evidence.98  Patents and other published documents from before the filing 
of the patent under review, known collectively by the shorthand prior art 
references,99 are a key type of extrinsic evidence for experts, and the 
courts, to consider: 
[C]ourts are free to consider the prior art when ruling on claim 
construction. . . . Even apart from prior art recited in the patent and the 
prosecution history, it is important for trial courts to have the context of 
other prior art that will form the basis of an invalidity defense.  Those 
prior art references may play as large a role in shaping the claim-
construction dispute as does the accused device.100 
                                                          
 94.   FED. R. EVID. 702(b).  Those underlying materials need not be otherwise admissible 
evidence in the case, so long as “experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds 
of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.”  FED. R. EVID. 703.  
 95.   See MENELL ET AL., supra note 88, at 5-16–5-18 (describing such tutorials). 
 96.   See id. at 5-84. 
 97.   Gen. Protecht Grp., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 619 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
 98.   See Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1289 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (according no weight to an expert’s opinion on claim meaning that is not grounded in 
evidence showing a claim term’s accepted meaning in the relevant field); Sinorgchem Co., 
Shandong v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1137 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (same).  In short, 
“[e]xpert opinions should be grounded both in the intrinsic evidence and by support in other 
independent, reliable sources.” MENELL ET AL., supra note 88, at 5-43. 
 99.   See MUELLER, supra note 4, at 229 (noting that “prior art references . . . are documents 
such as patents, articles from scientific journals, and other technical literature,” establishing a 
baseline for what is unpatentably old under 35 U.S.C. § 102—“the catalog or universe of prior art 
that potentially can be cited by the USPTO in rejecting a patent applicant’s claims”). 
 100.   MENELL ET AL., supra note 88, at 5-23–5-24; see also id. at 5-39 (noting that “extrinsic 
evidence can be useful [to claim construction], and Phillips and Teva confirm that district courts are 
free to consider extrinsic evidence, including expert testimony, dictionaries, treatises, and other such 
sources”). 
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This art-specific material from about the time the patent was drafted and 
filed, which reflects usage among patent claimants and others in the art at 
that time, justifies the expert’s opinion and educates the trial judge.  The 
judge can then make a well-supported finding in light of that material 
when its significance has been explained. 
A recent Federal Circuit case illustrates the vital role such extrinsic 
usage evidence can play in resolving fact disputes in an indefiniteness 
case.  In Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Polar Electro Oy,101 the district 
court found the claim terms “in-band” and “out-of-band” fatally 
indefinite under the Nautilus “reasonable certainty” standard, and the 
Federal Circuit affirmed that result.102  Interestingly, though it had 
already conducted a hearing on the parties’ claim construction disputes, 
the district court held a new hearing and considered more briefing in the 
case after the Supreme Court decided Nautilus.103  Moreover, at the 
district court’s request, the parties “retain[ed] experts in order to 
ascertain the perspective of persons skilled in the art” and then “the 
district court held an evidentiary hearing to hear expert testimony.”104  
Polar Electro, the accused infringer, prevailed in its indefiniteness 
defense.105 
On appeal, affirming that result, the Federal Circuit emphasized the 
central role of the extrinsic evidence in the case.  Patentee “Icon’s and its 
expert’s position ha[d] been that ‘in-band’ and ‘out-of-band’ 
communications are different from each other,” which “difference is 
alone sufficient to render the claims definite and capable of 
construction.”106  But Polar Electro had shown that, in the prior art, 
numerous authors used these terms with greater clarity107—clarity that 
Icon could readily have achieved.  The gap in the patent disclosure, 
Polar’s expert testified, was that “[t]he ‘relationship’ between ‘in-band’ 
and ‘out-of-band’ . . . is completely unspecified.”108  Crucially, that gap 
was demonstrably out of step with the customary usage that prior art 
references reflected: 
To support its position that a [point of] reference is required to provide 
context and give terms ‘in-band’ and ‘out-of-band’ meaning, Polar’s 
                                                          
 101.   656 F. App’x 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 102.   Id. at 1010. 
 103.   Id. at 1012. 
 104.   Id. at 1012–13.  
 105.   Id. at 1016. 
 106.   Id. at 1013. 
 107.   See id. at 1015. 
 108.   Id. at 1014. 
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expert proffered ten extrinsic prior art patents and text books, each of 
which ‘defines a reference that allows the reader to differentiate in-
band from out-of-band in relation to that reference.’109 
Icon had no rebuttal,110 and thus no explanation for why it failed to write 
its patent claims at least as clearly as several prior art references had 
been written.  As the Federal Circuit highlighted, “[t]his is precisely the 
type of extrinsic evidence upon which a district court may rely in 
analyzing the record before it when construing claim terms.”111  Using 
the prior art to see the choice Icon could have made, and thus to judge 
the quality of the choice Icon did make, both the trial and appellate 
courts concluded that Icon fell fatally short. 
Polar Electro shows that one can successfully evaluate reasonable 
certainty against the backdrop of a sample of prior art documents that 
establish how, at a given time, artisans in a field used words and phrases 
to achieve a given level of clarity.  What if, in that case, Polar Electro 
had gathered not a group of ten prior art references, but 100?  Or 1,000?  
Or 100,000?  And could both show and explain the upshot of that 
collection without unduly burdening the court?  These larger 
aggregations are the stuff of corpus linguistics.  And though they differ 
greatly in magnitude from the prior part bundle in Polar Electric, at 
bottom the aggregations serve to prove the same basic facts about usage 
at a given time and place.  Before examining corpus linguistics in more 
detail in Part IV, however, it is helpful to explore the meaning of 
reasonable care in tort law, as well as the rigors of reasonable notice 
under the Due Process clause. 
III. DETERMINING REASONABLY CERTAIN NOTICE 
Nautilus, abjuring perfect clarity and condemning studied vagueness, 
demands that a patent claim “inform those skilled in the art about the 
scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”112  How does one 
determine, in a given case, whether a claim has achieved a level of 
clarity that is reasonable, rather than too low?  (Clarity greater than the 
reasonable level is no cause for objection.)  Generally speaking, 
reasonableness connotes a good fit between means and ends amid varied 
options and cross-cutting goals, a point of moderation that 
                                                          
 109.   Id. at 1015 (emphasis added) (quoting the district court’s Markman decision in the case). 
 110.   See id. at 1015 n.1. 
 111.   Id. at 1015. 
 112.   Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). 
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accommodates competing values and avoids extremes.113  After 
discussing tort law’s reasonable care standard and the evidentiary value 
of custom, I consider litigation procedures that mandate reasonable 
notice, where the duty rolls with the available means.  Both suggest that 
we judge reasonable certainty against available options. 
A. Reasonable Care 
“Negligence, the foundation of tort law, turns on a reasonableness 
standard.”114  In particular, “[t]he premise of negligence law is that we 
owe everyone a duty to exercise reasonable care in the conduct of our 
affairs.”115  The current Restatement thus provides that “[a] person acts 
negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the 
circumstances.”116  The prior two Restatements were to the same 
effect.117  The standard is an open one, “permit[ting] negligence to 
function as an all-purpose accident tort.”118  By demanding reasonable 
care, the negligence tort moderates between the untenable extremes of 
perfect security for plaintiffs and perfect freedom for defendants.  It also 
refracts this moderation through a mutuality lens, “entrench[ing] the 
principle that being reasonable requires constraining one’s conduct by 
reference to the perils one creates for others.”119 
H.L.A. Hart highlighted the negligence tort’s synthesis of 
moderation and mutuality, though he did so with an eye toward 
understanding how the law deploys general standards to govern varied 
circumstances.  After discussing the use of general standards in 
                                                          
 113.   See MacCormick, supra note 29, at 1587 (“[W]hat is presupposed in any resort to 
reasonableness as a standard is that there is some topic or focus of concern to which, in accordance 
with variable circumstances, various factors are relevant, these having to be set in an overall balance 
of values one way or the other.”) (emphasis added); REASONABLENESS AND LAW, supra note 29, at 
xi (“As a normative criterion . . . the reasonable . . . is structured by a core meaning that consists in 
its calling to take into account different claims and reasons so as to find among them a common 
ground and an equilibrium . . . .”). 
 114.   Zaring, supra note 26, at 536; see also id. at 539 (observing that “reasonableness has 
proven to be . . . so useful [a concept in torts] that it has become the jurisprudential underpinning of 
that entire field of law”). 
 115.   Id. at 537. 
 116.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 117.   See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Unless the actor is 
a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a 
reasonable man under like circumstances.”); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1934) 
(“Unless the actor is a child or an insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must conform 
to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”). 
 118.   JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORTS 82 (2010). 
 119.   Zipursky, supra note 29, at 2162. 
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administration,120 he turned to the use of such standards in adjudication.  
Concluding that adjudication is fruitful “where the sphere to be 
controlled is such that . . . the range of circumstances, though very 
varied, covers familiar features of common experience,” he observed that 
in such cases “common judgments of what is ‘reasonable’ can be used by 
the law.”121  To illustrate the strategy, Hart turned to “[t]he most famous 
example of this technique in Anglo-American law”—the reasonable care 
standard in negligence.122  He described the standard’s target as an 
intermediate point of balance respecting two parties’ interests: 
[S]anctions may be applied to those who fail to take reasonable care to 
avoid inflicting physical injuries . . . .  But what is reasonable or due 
care in a concrete situation? . . . What we are striving for in the 
application of standards of reasonable care is to ensure (1) that 
precautions will be taken which will avert substantial harm, yet (2) that 
the precautions are such that the burden of proper precautions does not 
involve too great a sacrifice of other respectable interests.123 
Or as Professor MacCormick put it, exploring Hart’s analysis, it is “the 
striking of a balance between the two values of relative security from 
harm and relative liberty to do as you like.”124  A plaintiff’s plea is for 
security, and a defendant’s is for liberty.  Reasonable care vindicates 
both, in an equilibrium that credits both in each case and across the run 
of cases.  “Being reasonable requires a curtailment of what one might 
really want in order to accommodate others’ legitimate interests.”125 
                                                          
 120.   H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 131 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining that “the legislature 
sets up very general standards and then delegates to an administrative, rule-making body acquainted 
with the varying types of case, the task of fashioning rules adapted to their special needs”). 
 121.   Id. at 132. 
 122.   Id.  
 123.   Id. at 132–33. 
 124.   MacCormick, supra note 29, at 1585; see also id. at 1584–85 (“On the one hand, we set 
value upon the security of persons and their property and their economic interests from damage 
resulting from others’ acts.  On this account, we think it right and proper that each person take care 
to avoid inflicting bodily harm on others or damaging their property or economic well-being.  On the 
other hand, we set value upon the freedom of individuals to pursue their own activities and way of 
life without having to undertake an intolerable burden of precautions against the risks of damage to 
others.  The law has to express a balance between these values in general terms . . . by prescribing 
that such care has to be taken as would be taken by a reasonable and prudent person.”) (footnotes 
omitted).  Courts have also made this point.  See, e.g., Ray v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 696 A.2d 399, 
404 (D.C. 1997) (observing that “our modern rule of negligent liability proceeds from a balance 
struck between an actor’s freedom of choice and another’s security in person and property”). 
 125.   Zipursky, supra note 29, at 2162.  Professor Ripstein similarly described the mutuality that 
reasonable care instantiates: “Reasonableness tests are not a proxy for some other measure of 
responsibility; they are constitutive of responsibility, understood in terms of the ways in which 
people are accountable to each other.”  Arthur Ripstein, Reasonable Persons in Private Law, in 
REASONABLENESS AND LAW, supra note 29, at 256. 
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Transposing this to the claim definiteness context, an accused 
infringer’s plea is for more clarity, and a patentee’s is for more charity.  
Reasonable certainty vindicates both, in an equilibrium that credits both 
in each case and across the run of cases.  Being reasonable requires a 
patentee to curtail its interest in ex post enforcement flexibility, in order 
to accommodate the public’s legitimate interest in ex ante planning.126  
At the same time, it requires an accused infringer to curtail its interest in 
perfect clarity, in order to accommodate the patentee’s legitimate interest 
in a fair appraisal of the clarity its claim drafting efforts achieved, given 
the options that were available in the art at the time.127  In this sense, 
reasonable certainty is less a proxy for claim definiteness than it is 
constitutive of it, understood as a way that patentees and the public are 
accountable to one another for the clarity the claim language provides.128 
Returning to the negligence tort, the reasonable care standard is not 
simply an abstract commitment to moderation and mutuality, though they 
are critically important precepts.129  In concrete terms, demonstrating that 
one failed to act with reasonable care (or, rather, successfully hewed to 
it) includes providing an evidentiary context for evaluating the accused 
tortfeasor’s conduct.  Evidence of customary practice, in particular, plays 
a central role.  “[T]he rule for the greater part of negligence law” is that 
“evidence that the defendant complied with customary understandings of 
what ordinary care requires is highly relevant to the breach issue, but not 
                                                          
 126.   See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“[A] patent 
must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed, thereby apprising the public of 
what is still open to them.  Otherwise there would be a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and 
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims.  And absent a meaningful 
definiteness check, we are told, patent applicants face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into 
their claims.  Eliminating that temptation is in order, and the patent drafter is in the best position to 
resolve the ambiguity in patent claims.”) (internal alterations, citations, footnotes, and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 127.   See id. at 2128 (“[T]he definiteness requirement must take into account the inherent 
limitations of language.  Some modicum of uncertainty, the Court has recognized, is the price of 
ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation.  One must bear in mind, moreover, that patents 
are not addressed to lawyers, or even to the public generally, but rather to those skilled in the 
relevant art.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 128.   Cf. Ripstein, supra note 125, at 256; see also Zipursky, supra note 29, at 2169 (“The 
mutuality conception of reasonableness is found in other parts of the law—such as nuisance law—
and throughout ordinary conversation as well.  A reasonable person in this sense is not wholly 
insensitive to the fact that, like her, others have wishes, desires, demands, and needs.  She has a 
sense of mutuality.  This is a significant part of what the reasonable person or the reasonably prudent 
person standard highlights . . . .”). 
 129.   See Zipursky, supra note 29, at 2169 (“Reasonableness in negligence law relates both to 
the idea of moderate care and to the idea of mutuality as to others’ needs. Moderation and mutuality 
is the watchword of negligence law.”). 
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dispositive.”130  The current Restatement frames the value of custom 
evidence from both directions, providing as follows: 
(a) An actor’s compliance with the custom of the community, or of 
others in like circumstances, is evidence that the actor’s conduct is not 
negligent but does not preclude a finding of negligence. 
(b) An actor’s departure from the custom of the community, or of 
others in like circumstances, in a way that increases risk is evidence of 
the actor’s negligence but does not require a finding of negligence.131 
The prior Restatement is to like effect,132 and both draw on the approach 
Judge Learned Hand took in a famed admiralty case against two tugboats 
that lost their barges in a storm that took them unawares (for lack of 
radios on board), The T.J. Hooper case.133  As Judge Hand observed in 
the case, rejecting the contention that industry practice was dispositive, 
“in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but 
strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged 
in the adoption of new and available devices.”134  Custom is relevant, but 
not dispositive.  Of course, there may be no relevant customary practice 
that throws light on a given defendant’s conduct.  In such a case, the 
parties and the court may find it useful to consider the circumstances of 
the accident in light of the burden of greater precautions, the likelihood 
of harm in their absence, and the magnitude of that harm should it 
occur—in other words, the framework Judge Hand developed in another 
renowned admiralty case, United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,135 
decided 15 years after The T.J. Hooper.136 
                                                          
 130.   GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 118, at 144.  The “courts have crafted an exception 
for . . . claims for professional negligence—i.e., malpractice—and particularly medical malpractice.”  
Id. at 145.  This exception is not germane here, inasmuch as claim indefiniteness is an attack on a 
particular patent claim’s validity, not necessarily an attack on a patent drafter’s professional 
competence in writing that claim in a given way. 
 131.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 132.   See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“In determining 
whether conduct is negligent, the customs of the community, or of others under like circumstances, 
are factors to be taken into account, but are not controlling where a reasonable man would not follow 
them.”). 
 133.   60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 134.   Id. at 740. 
 135.   159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 136.   Professors Goldberg & Zipursky critique the mathematicization of Judge Hand’s Carroll 
Towing approach by law and economics scholars and judges, GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 
118, at 149–51, maintaining that “Hand himself never supposed that his formula could be calculated 
or applied with any sort of precision . . . claim[ing instead that] it had value primarily in focusing 
attention on the sorts of considerations that arguably matter most to the determination of fault.”  Id. 
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In a claim definiteness dispute, the analog to custom evidence in a 
negligence case is semantic-usage evidence about words or phrases in the 
relevant technological field at the time the patentee drafted the claim 
under review.  That usage evidence demonstrates, objectively, the range 
of established semantic expressions on which patentees customarily drew 
to convey a specific idea, as well as the backdrop against which a 
patentee could draft a bespoke definition of its own (if that specially 
defined claim language would better capture the invention, in the 
patentee’s estimation).  Corpus linguistics methodologies can provide us 
reliable access to objective usage data on a tailored, targeted basis. 
Negligence law’s reasonable care standard, then, provides neither 
that one may utterly ignore risks to others nor that one must compensate 
others for any and all harms.  Reasonableness moderates between these 
extremes.  Evidence of customary practice, when available, goes a long 
way toward resolving whether a particular negligence defendant acted 
reasonably under the relevant circumstances.  The same is true for claim 
definiteness: Perfect clarity is not obtainable, nor is self-serving 
ambiguity tolerable.  We require reasonable certainty to moderate 
between these extremes.  Evidence of customary semantic usage, which 
we should endeavor to make more readily available, goes a long way 
toward resolving whether a particular patentee chose clear claim 
language for the relevant art at the relevant time.  Critically, what this 
perspective rules out of bounds is an accused infringer’s contention that a 
given claim term is indefinite simply by virtue of the fact that—in court, 
long after the patent was drafted—one can show a word or phrase that, 
had it been used in the claim instead, would have prevented the semantic 
uncertainty on which the accused infringer’s attack focuses.  Of course 
one can confect, with the benefit of hindsight, an imagined alternative 
text that makes the actual claim term seem less clear.  But one can just as 
easily confect alternative language that makes the actual claim term seem 
clearer.  Both parties, in short, can play an “it’s not as good [bad] as X” 
game.  In a reasonableness framework that game isn’t worth the candle.  
                                                          
at 149.  This question of deep tort theory is not one that I can, or need to, resolve here.  The key 
point, for present purposes, is that in actual tort cases custom evidence can be quite relevant to, but 
not dispositive on, the core question whether the accused tortfeasor has fallen below the standard of 
reasonable care—a point that even the most law-and-economics-focused jurists readily accept.  See, 
e.g., Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) 
(discussing the role of custom evidence on the question of breach).  Indeed, Carroll Towing itself 
adverts to the heft that custom evidence likely would have had in the case, had the defendant’s 
employee been absent only overnight, rather than during working hours.  Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 
at 173 (“We need not say whether, even in such crowded waters as New York Harbor a bargee must 
be aboard at night at all; it may be that the custom is otherwise . . . and that, if so, the situation is one 
where custom should control.  We leave that question open . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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The central question to illuminate, instead, is whether the claim term 
under review, when contextualized with actual usage evidence from the 
relevant art and time, embodied a drafting choice well calculated to 
provide clear notice as of that time.  The proper inquiry thus requires that 
we shine a brighter light on the textual alternatives that were 
demonstrably available in the relevant field at the relevant time.  It is 
helpful to recognize, in this connection, that the demand for reasonable 
efforts at providing prior notice of a judicial proceeding, under the 
Constitution’s Due Process clause, has also come to focus on the 
demonstrably available means for providing such notice in a given place 
and time.  This reasonable-notice jurisprudence merits attention here. 
B. Reasonable Notice 
The law predicates the sound adjudication of duties and freedoms on 
reasonably certain notice to the parties affected, not only in the patent 
system but also in the basic fabric of any binding judicial process.  It is 
fundamental to U.S. constitutional law that the state cannot deprive one 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.137  The Supreme 
Court elaborated on the constitutional floor for adequate notice of 
judicial process, more than sixty-five years ago, in Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,138 and Mullane remains the governing Due 
Process standard.139  Efforts at notice sometimes fail, and a failure of 
                                                          
 137.   U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3 (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law[.]”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (“No state shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”). 
 138.   339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 139.   See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (“Due process 
requires notice ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).”) (concluding that a defect in service 
of process did not rise to the level of an unconstitutional deprivation of Due Process).  The U.S. 
Courts of Appeals routinely invoke Mullane’s Due Process standard on notice questions.  See, e.g., 
DPWN Holdings (USA), Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 747 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 972 (11th Cir. 2012); Gates v. City of Chicago, 623 
F.3d 389, 401 (7th Cir. 2010).  And Mullane has remained the central touchstone for conceptualizing 
what Due Process requires.  See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (“Since 
Mullane was decided, we have regularly turned to it when confronted with questions regarding the 
adequacy of the method used to give notice.”); Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 466 
(2000) (“[T]he proceedings did not comply with Rule 15, and neither did they comport with due 
process.  See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) . . . .”); 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential principle of due 
process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’ Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 313 (1950).”); 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 
1074 (4th ed. 2016) (stating that Mullane “generally is recognized as the keystone of the modern 
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actual notice does not, by itself, constitute a Due Process defect.140  
What, then, is an adequate notice mechanism? What would fall below the 
Due Process minimum? 
The process that is due turns on the specific facts.141  The particular 
question in Mullane was the constitutionally minimally adequate notice 
due to a common trust’s beneficiaries before a binding judicial process 
could cut off their right to bring further claims against the trustee for a 
prior period’s management and fees.142  The trust company, complying 
with the process specified by the New York state statute that allowed for 
common trusts, gave notice of the judicial proceeding to the beneficiaries 
“by publication in a local newspaper.”143  The trustee did so even though, 
for some of the affected beneficiaries, it had names and mailing 
addresses on file; indeed, it had mailed information to the beneficiaries at 
the time it created the common fund in question.144  Although the Court 
could accept publication notice—“a customary substitute . . . where it is 
not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning”—
for the beneficiaries “whose interests or whereabouts could not with due 
diligence be ascertained,”145 it could not accept publication notice for the 
beneficiaries the trustee knew by name and address: “we find no tenable 
ground for dispensing with a serious effort to inform them personally of 
the [judicial] accounting, at least by ordinary mail to the record 
addresses.”146  The trustee bank’s reliance on a newspaper announcement 
fell short of the “elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process”: namely, “notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action.”147 
                                                          
philosophy regarding the due process aspects of a notice requirement and the importance of the case 
should not be underestimated”). 
 140.   See Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170.  Perfect notice is not required—just as perfect security is 
not required in negligence law, and perfect clarity is not required of patent claims.  
 141.   See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956) (noting “the impossibility of 
setting up a rigid formula as to the kind of notice that must be given; notice required will vary with 
circumstances and conditions”). 
 142.   339 U.S. at 311 (“We understand that every right which beneficiaries would otherwise 
have against the trust company, either as trustee of the common fund or as trustee of any individual 
trust, for improper management of the common trust fund during the period covered by the 
accounting is sealed and wholly terminated by the decree.”). 
 143.   Id. at 309. 
 144.   Id. at 310, 318. 
 145.   Id. at 317. 
 146.   Id. at 318. 
 147.   Id. at 314 (emphasis added). 
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Critically, the Court contrasted a genuine attempt at actual notice 
with an inadequate “process which is a mere gesture,”148 framing the 
inquiry as a comparison of a notifier’s chosen method with the other 
methods then available: 
The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually 
informing the absentee [person] might reasonably adopt to accomplish 
it.  The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any 
chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself 
reasonably certain to inform those affected or, where conditions do not 
reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially 
less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and 
customary substitutes.149 
In other words, in a pattern analogous that which we see in Festo 
regarding equivalent infringement150 and in Nautilus regarding 
indefiniteness,151 the Court looks to the means of notice such a party 
could have used to judge the quality of the means of notice this party did 
use.  And, consistent with a reasonableness approach that strikes a 
balance between extremes as it vindicates the legitimate interests of both 
sides, Due Process neither demands perfection (which would unfairly 
hold the sender to an unachievable goal) nor accepts sloth (which would 
unfairly disregard the recipient’s right to heard).  The trustee bank in 
Mullane fell short because, in the particular circumstances of that case, it 
used the plainly less effective of two feasible options: “Where the names 
and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, 
the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to 
apprise them of its pendency.”152  Given that personal service of written 
notice meets any test,153 one who actually strove to approximate it would 
mail notice to known names and addresses, not drop an ad in the local 
classifieds. 
                                                          
 148.   Id. at 315. 
 149.   Id. (emphases added) (citations omitted). 
 150.   See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 151.   See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
 152.   339 U.S. at 318; see also id. at 319 (“The statutory notice to known beneficiaries is 
inadequate, not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because under the circumstances it is 
not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand.  
However it may have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as an efficient and 
inexpensive means of communication.  Moreover, the fact that the trust company has been able to 
give mailed notice to known beneficiaries at the time the common trust fund was established is 
persuasive that postal notification at the time of accounting would not seriously burden the plan.”). 
 153.   Id. at 313 (“Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is the classic form of 
notice always adequate in any type of proceeding.”). 
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Mullane provides a framework for inquiry, not a “send notice by 
mail” rule: because the adequacy of notice turns on the details of a given 
case, notice by mail, though required in Mullane, may fall short in a 
different case.  In Jones v. Flowers,154 for example, the Court concluded 
that a state lands commissioner’s use of certified mail fell below the Due 
Process minimum.  The Court in Jones acknowledged that, at least in the 
case “when someone is home to sign for the letter,” this more formal 
type of mail “makes actual notice more likely, because requiring the 
recipient’s signature protects against misdelivery.”155  The problem for 
the commissioner, however, was that both his certified letters to Jones, 
the person whose property was sold to cover unpaid taxes, had twice 
been returned to the commissioner, unopened and marked 
“unclaimed.”156  Jones learned of the State’s forced sale of his property 
only after it had been sold to Flowers, and Flowers “had an unlawful 
detainer notice delivered to the property.”157  Applying Mullane, the 
Court held that “when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, 
the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide 
notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is 
practicable to do so.”158  The returned, unclaimed letter necessitates more 
effort because that is what, in the words of Mullane, “one desirous of 
actually informing” the other party would recognize: 
We do not think that a person who actually desired to inform a real 
property owner of an impending tax sale of a house he owns would do 
nothing when a certified letter sent to the owner is returned 
unclaimed. . . . [W]hen a letter is returned by the post office, the sender 
will ordinarily attempt to resend it, if it is practicable to do so.  This is 
especially true when, as here, the subject matter of the letter concerns 
such an important and irreversible prospect as the loss of a house.  
Although the State may have made a reasonable calculation of how to 
reach Jones, it had good reason to suspect when the notice was returned 
that Jones was “no better off than if the notice had never been sent.”  
Deciding to take no further action is not what someone “desirous of 
actually informing” Jones would do; such a person would take further 
reasonable steps if any were available.159 
                                                          
 154.   547 U.S. 220 (2006). 
 155.   Id. at 234. 
 156.   Id. at 223–24. 
 157.   Id. at 224.  “The notice was served on Jones’ daughter, who contacted Jones and notified 
him of the tax sale.”  Id.  
 158.   See id. at 223, 225. 
 159.   Id. at 229–30 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 238 (“[W]e 
conclude, at the end of the day, that someone who actually wanted to alert Jones that he was in 
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In this case, the further steps that were reasonably available included 
“resend[ing] the notice [to Jones] by regular mail, so that a signature was 
not required,” or “post[ing a] notice on the front door,” or “address[ing] 
otherwise undeliverable mail to ‘occupant.’”160  The lesson of Jones is 
that reasonable notice takes account of both the available options and the 
notifier’s best information about how effective the available mechanisms 
are likely to be at providing actual notice to the intended recipient.  One 
must use the available means of notice that, objectively, would satisfy 
the well-informed person who actually strove to give real notice. 
Tort law’s reasonable care standard and procedural law’s reasonable 
notice standard, then, fill out and reinforce the reasonable certainty 
inquiry that Nautilus mandates, including the careful consideration of 
facts about semantic usage that Teva underscores.  Evidence of custom, 
whether to prove that one behaved with reasonable care (e.g., the lack of 
radios in The T.J. Hooper) or that one provided reasonable notice of a 
judicial process (e.g., the use of publication notice in Mullane), is 
relevant, but not dispositive.  For patent claims, the relevant custom is 
the semantic usage of those in the relevant art at the relevant time.161  
Reasonableness vindicates the interests of opposing parties in each case, 
and across cases, by avoiding the extremes that would wholly sacrifice 
one side’s interests to those of the other.  We anchor that point of balance 
in a fact-sensitive assessment of the demonstrably available means that 
the responsible party—patentee, tort defendant, litigation plaintiff—
could have used, to fairly judge the means that party did use.  
Specifically, following Mullane, to judge the responsible party’s past 
conduct objectively, it helps to ask what a party actually striving to 
achieve the desired goal would have done in those circumstances with 
those available means.  Whether the goal is a patent claim with a 
reasonably certain boundary, a course of conduct undertaken with 
reasonable care, or a means of notice reasonably calculated to apprise an 
interested party of a judicial process, we reject a hindsight-driven 
standard of perfection in favor of a fact-driven standard of good-faith, if 
imperfect, effort. 
                                                          
danger of losing his house would do more when the attempted notice letter was returned unclaimed, 
and there was more that reasonably could be done.”). 
 160.   Id. at 234–35.  
 161.   Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (recognizing that, in a 
patent enforcement case, a district court judge may need “to consult extrinsic evidence in order to 
understand . . . the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period”). 
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IV. JUDGING DEFINITENESS IN PATENT CLAIMS 
Both reasonable care and reasonable notice highlight the need, in the 
case of clashing interests, for moderation, mutuality, and a focus on a 
rich factual record about customary practice and readily available 
alternatives at a given place and time.  All of this is powerful guidance 
for implementing Nautilus’s reasonable certainty standard for claim 
definiteness and Teva’s endorsement of extrinsic usage evidence.  The 
Federal Circuit’s 2016 Polar Electro decision strongly suggests the 
direct relevance of these concepts, given its reliance on extrinsic 
evidence of customary semantic usage in the prior art when judging 
whether a challenged claim is fatally indefinite.162  It is important, in 
view of this guidance, to further detail—in both process and evidence 
terms—the optimal way to assess whether a given claim term is,163 or 
was,164 a reasonably certain means to the end of clear notice. 
To judge definiteness objectively, we require evidence of customary 
usage in the art from the time the patent application was filed, which 
helps establish the range of available established words and phrases that 
a patent writer could have used, or against the backdrop of which a 
patent writer could have provided an explicit, application-specific 
definition (i.e., been his or her “own lexicographer”).  How, then, do we 
amplify the factual materials?  We need to get more usage facts into the 
mix, with methods that are robust, orderly, and readily applicable to the 
specific questions that arise in concrete disputes.  The tools developed in 
corpus linguistics can provide the facts the patent system needs, as the 
materials below demonstrate.  Because enforcement litigation and patent 
examination tap into and process evidence differently, it is helpful to 
begin by considering, separately, these two contexts for deploying the 
evidence that corpus linguistics can provide. 
A. The Litigation Process 
In patent litigation, an accused infringer can raise the defense that the 
asserted patent claim is invalid for indefiniteness.165  Every claim enjoys 
                                                          
 162.   See supra notes 101–11 and accompanying text. 
 163.   During patent prosecution, per In re Packard, it is a present-tense question.  See supra 
notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
 164.   During patent enforcement litigation, per Nautilus, it is a past-tense question.  See supra 
note 77 and accompanying text. 
 165.   See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) (2012).  The accused infringers in Teva and Nautilus did just 
that.  Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 835–36; Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2127 
(2014). 
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a presumption of validity,166 including a subsidiary presumption of 
definiteness,167 and thus it falls to the accused infringer168 to provide 
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.169  In addition, to help 
ensure that judging purported indefiniteness does not make tacit resort to 
a hindsight-driven demand for perfect clarity that unduly credits post hoc 
allegations of vagueness confected for litigation,170 it is appropriate to 
require the accused infringer to initiate its indefiniteness defense with 
concrete evidence—not conjecture—that the clarity-enhancing language 
now proffered was demonstrably available to patent writers in the 
relevant art when the patent in suit was sought at the Patent Office.  We 
can use the process of proof that Festo established as a template for an 
indefiniteness inquiry that focuses on this ex ante assessment; to do so 
comports with Nautilus’s focus on the critical policy tension, so central 
to Festo, between the need for clarity and the imperfection of language. 
The process of proof patterned on Festo,171 mutatis mutandis, is as 
follows: 
• First, the accused infringer must come forward with evidence 
showing one or more concrete words or phrases, actually used in one or 
more English-language prior art patents from the same172 technological 
art, that would have more clearly delineated the scope of the claim for 
                                                          
 166.   35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.  Each claim . . . shall be 
presumed valid independently . . . .”). 
 167.   See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 n.10 (observing that § 282’s “presumption of validity . . . 
incorporates th[e § 112] definiteness requirement by reference”). 
 168.   35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim 
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). 
 169.   See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102–03 (2011) (rejecting Microsoft’s 
effort to overturn the case law requiring clear and convincing evidence of invalidity). 
 170.   Assessing purported indefiniteness appears to include a risk of hindsight bias, akin to the 
risk of hindsight bias that can affect the assessment of purported obviousness.  The risk of hindsight 
bias in an obviousness inquiry has long been recognized in cases and commentaries.  See Joseph 
Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 239–50 (2008) (discussing 
these cases and commentaries).  But I have not seen recognition of this indefiniteness-related risk of 
hindsight in any case or commentary.  Nautilus, in critiquing the Federal Circuit’s insoluble 
ambiguity standard, applied as of the time of the enforcement litigation, did take pains to instruct 
that the proper measure is “the understanding of a skilled artisan at the time of the patent 
application, not that of a court viewing matters post hoc.”  134 S. Ct. at 2130 (first emphasis added).  
The critique was thus alert to the way that the Federal Circuit standard’s substantive criterion, 
“tolerat[ing] imprecision just short of that rendering a claim ‘insolubly ambiguous,’” could 
“diminish the definiteness requirement’s public-notice function . . . .”  Id.  The risk of hindsight bias 
suggests, in addition, that the Federal Circuit standard’s timing could diminish a patentee’s 
legitimate flexibility in crafting claim language, even as it diminished public notice from the other 
direction. 
 171.   See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 172.   There are varied ways to think about sameness in this context.  One proxy to consider is a 
patent’s assigned Patent Office class.  See infra note 232. 
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the skilled reader, for the same or a substantially similar feature, than do 
the actual words or phrases used in the claim under review.  To ensure 
that the prior patents establish language usage that was genuinely 
available to the patentee, the focal category of prior art should be patents 
from more than a year before the application for the patent in suit was 
filed.173 
• Second, to rebut the accused’s evidence of more clearly delineative, 
actually available claim language from the relevant art and time, the 
patentee must come forward with evidence showing that, at the time the 
patent was drafted, one skilled in the art could not reasonably be 
expected to have better reduced the risk of reader confusion, either by (a) 
using the better-informing word or phrase from the prior art, or by (b) 
expressly defining the challenged word or phrase that was actually used, 
such that the resulting claim language (and any patentee-drafted 
definition supporting it) would have been at least as clearly informative 
as the word or phrase from the prior art. 
• Third, the district court, making subsidiary findings to resolve any 
genuine issues of material fact about usage, resolves the ultimate legal 
question whether the actual claim term is fatally indefinite, given the 
alternative established usages or definition-writing options available to 
the patentee at the time the claim was written and the patent application 
was filed. 
It bears noting that this process of proof, though modeled on Festo, 
would fully accommodate the evidence and reasoning in the Federal 
Circuit’s 2016 Polar Electro decision using factual findings about 
evidence of customary usage from the prior art to ground an 
indefiniteness judgment.174  Indeed, the more tailored process just 
sketched is an improvement over more haphazard approaches that may 
allow for the sound evidentiary process in Polar Electro but do not 
                                                          
 173.   All such patents are unquestionably prior art, both under the 1952 Patent Act that prevailed 
before 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), and the new Patent Act as amended in 2011 by the America 
Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1), 102(b)(1) (2012).  See generally MUELLER, supra note 4, at 
253–56 (discussing the old § 102(b)), 317–19 (discussing the new § 102).  I have no strong view, at 
the moment, about whether or not English-language patents from other jurisdictions—such as the 
U.K., Canada, Australia, or New Zealand—should be included.  Language usage in one or more of 
these countries differs enough from that of the U.S. that I worry that including their patents, although 
formally eligible as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (old and new), could skew the indefiniteness 
inquiry here toward false positives.  Given that U.S. patents must be in English, however, 37 C.F.R. 
§§ 1.52(b)(ii), (d)(1) (2016), it strikes me as necessary to limit the prior art evidence of usage to 
patent documents written in English as an original matter (even though these foreign-language 
patents, too, are formally prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (old and new)). 
 174.   See supra notes 101–11 and accompanying text. 
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ensure it.  And that would be so even without the more rigorously 
derived evidence of customary usage that corpus analysis can provide. 
B. The Examination Process 
The Patent Office receives, at present, from about 500,000 to 
600,000 utility patent applications per year,175 each one of which 
contains about two or three independent claims.176  Once issued, a patent 
can be licensed, or a third party threatened with enforcement, without the 
patent’s validity ever being tested in court.177  Moreover, during 
examination—in contrast to litigation—an indefiniteness problem can be 
corrected,178 by the simple expedient of a claim amendment or “a 
separate definition of the unclear language.”179  It is important, then, to 
ensure that the Patent Office, no less so than the courts, targets the 
Nautilus standard of reasonable certainty. 
The Patent Office examines a patent application for compliance with 
all the formal and substantive requirements of the Patent Act,180 
including claim definiteness.181  The Federal Circuit’s recent Packard 
decision provides the procedural framework: It is the patent examiner’s 
responsibility, in the first instance, to identify words or phrases in the 
applicant’s claims that are unclear and to describe why they are 
unclear,182 to “provid[e] the applicant a well-grounded identification of 
[any] clarity problems.”183  After that, “if the applicant does not 
adequately respond to that prima facie case,” the examiner can “confirm 
                                                          
 175.   US Patent Activity Years 1790 to the Present, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). 
 176.   See Dennis Crouch, Independent Patent Claims, PATENTLYO (June 24, 2015), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/06/independent-patent-claims.html; Dennis Crouch, Average 
Number of Independent Claims Per Patent, PATENTLYO (Jan. 25, 2014), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/average-independent-patent.html. 
 177.   See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1500–06 (2001) (discussing, broadly, “what patentees do with their patents”). 
 178.   See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M–I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(observing that “it is highly desirable that patent examiners demand that applicants [resolve any 
ambiguity in a patent claim] in appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during 
prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation”). 
 179.   In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 180.   35 U.S.C. § 131 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(1) (2016). 
 181.   See Packard, 751 F.3d at 1311; see also MPEP § 2173 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) 
(providing guidance to examiners). 
 182.   See Packard, 751 F.3d at 1312–13. 
 183.   Id. at 1313. 
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that rejection on the substantive basis of having failed to meet the 
requirements of § 112(b).”184 
A critical facet of this interactive process, then, is that the patent 
examiner puts an unclear word or phrase in the context of the relevant 
prior art and the patterns of language usage that prior art references 
reflect.  As Packard puts it, the examiner scrutinizes claim language for 
clarity from “the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art.”185  
Packard, moreover, casts the clarity standard for the examination stage 
in much the same terms as Nautilus, “invok[ing a] standard of 
reasonable precision in the use of language in the context of the 
circumstances.”186  Judging reasonable certainty, to those in a given art at 
a given time, can certainly include evidence of usage in prior art 
patents.187  No doubt an experienced examiner, having analyzed many (in 
some instance, very many) claims in the relevant art, provides an 
important part of this language-usage context simply by dint of long 
practice.  We can also augment the examiner-provided context with the 
tools of corpus linguistics.  Indeed, a great benefit of the scale of 
computer-analyzed usage corpora is that they provide usage data with 
greater accuracy, speed, and comprehensiveness than an unaided person 
can achieve. 
C. The Corpus Linguistics Evidence 
“Corpus linguistics has,” to date, “had a very modest impact on legal 
practice and scholarship,”188 though the scholarship landscape is 
                                                          
 184.   Id. at 1312; see also id. at 1313 (“Given the role of the applicant in the process, it is a 
reasonable implementation of the examination responsibility, as applied to § 112(b), for the USPTO, 
upon providing the applicant a well-grounded identification of clarity problems, to demand 
persuasive responses on pain of rejection.”). 
 185.   Id. at 1312. 
 186.   Id. at 1313 (emphasis added).  Additionally, the Packard court expressly rejects the goal of 
perfect clarity: “The requirement, applied to the real world of modern technology, does not 
contemplate in every case a verbal precision of the kind found in mathematics.  Nor could it do so in 
a patent system that actually works, in practice, to provide effective protection for modern-day 
inventions.”  Id. 
 187.   See MPEP § 2173.02 ¶ II (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (“Definiteness of claim language 
must be analyzed, not in a vacuum, but in light of,” among other things, “(B) The teachings of the 
prior art[.]”). 
 188.   Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using 
Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 1203 
(2017).  Indeed, “[t]his subject is so new to legal circles that the first conference on the subject [of 
law and corpus linguistics] did not occur until Spring, 2016.”  Id.  As of early September 2017, the 
Westlaw JLR database contains only six articles the titles of which contain the phrase “corpus 
linguistics,” the earliest of which is dated 2011.  WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (follow 
“Advanced” hyperlink, search “corpus linguistics” in Name/Title field, and narrow by secondary 
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changing, especially in the neighboring areas of statutory 
interpretation189 and constitutional interpretation.190  One catalyzing 
resource has been Google’s Ngram viewer,191 an offshoot of the Google 
Books Library Project.192  Lawyers and legal scholars can now see that 
they have much to gain from the decades of experience that corpus 
linguistics experts can offer, including in the creation and use of software 
analysis tools.  The fact that these tools and methods can dovetail 
smoothly with extremely familiar, long-available computer-assisted legal 
research tools, such as Westlaw and Lexis, makes it that much easier for 
lawyers and legal scholars to consider the full value of corpus linguistics 
evidence.193 
                                                          
sources). 
 189.   See Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as 
an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 204–05 (2011); Stephen 
C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based 
Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1919 (2010); Neal Goldfarb, Words, 
Meanings, Corpora: A Lawyer’s Introduction to Meaning in the Framework of Corpus Linguistics 
43–44 (Jan. 26, 2017) (unpublished discussion draft), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2907485; Zachary D. 
Smith, United They Hold, Divided They Might Fail: A Corpus Linguistics Analysis of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Recent Ordinary Meaning Cases 4–5 (Dec. 18, 2015) (unpublished student article), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2781672; Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy A. Gales, Finding Ordinary 
Meaning in Law: The Judge, the Dictionary or the Corpus? 1 (Oct. 10, 2016) (unpublished article), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2850703. 
 190.   See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are ‘Officers of the United States’?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 15), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2918952; James C. Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to 
Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J.F. 20, 26 (2016); Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus 
Linguistics Help Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J.F. 57, 57–58 (2016); Strang, supra 
note 188, at 1202. 
 191.   Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited Sept. 8, 
2017).  
 192.   See id.; see also About Google Books, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://www.google.com/intl/en/ 
googlebooks/about/index.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).  For a key paper describing the technical 
features, and introducing the scholarly potential, of the Google Ngram viewer project, see Jean-
Baptiste Michel et al., Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, 331 
SCIENCE 176 (2011).  A group of law professors and computer scientists created a similar pilot 
project for analyzing the full-text corpus of U.S. Supreme Court decisions from 1791 to 2005.  See 
Daniel Martin Katz et al., Legal N-Grams? A Simple Approach to Track the ‘Evolution’ of Legal 
Language (Dec. 13, 2011) (unpublished conference proceeding), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1971953. 
Legal scholars who want to explore the corpus linguistics literature from inside can consult, in 
addition to the ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK and MCENERY & HARDIE books already cited, supra note 
33, the following helpful sources: PAUL BAKER, USING CORPORA IN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS (2006); 
SUSAN HUNSTON, CORPORA IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS (2002); GRAEME KENNEDY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO CORPUS LINGUISTICS (1998). 
 193.   See Phillips et al., supra note 190, at 23 (“Lawyers use corpora on a daily basis.  In a 
sense, Google and Westlaw or Lexis are corpora.”); Solan & Gales, supra note 189, at 4 (“Judges 
and legal scholars are accustomed to searching large banks of information for relevant instances of a 
word’s meaning.  That process characterizes the case method generally.”). 
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“[T]he aim” of corpus linguistics is simply “the analysis and 
description of language use, as realised in text(s).”194  Indeed, 
“[l]inguists have always used the word corpus to describe a collection of 
naturally occurring examples of language . . . collected for linguistic 
study.”195  The falling price and rising power of computing technology 
over the last few decades, however, “brought about a radical change” in 
the field: “Corpus linguistics is thus now inextricably linked to the 
computer, which has introduced incredible speed . . . and the ability to 
handle huge amounts of data.”196  The word corpus, as a result, “has been 
reserved for collections of texts (or parts of text) that are stored and 
accessed electronically.”197  To set the stage for exploring how the 
indefiniteness inquiry might avail itself of the fruits of corpus analysis, it 
is useful to describe the conventional types of corpora and analytical 
tools that linguists have developed. 
“A corpus is defined in terms of both its form and its purpose.”198  In 
particular, “[t]he corpus is stored in such a way that it can be studied 
non-linearly, and both quantitatively and qualitatively.”199  Linguists 
differentiate corpora with three key distinctions.  With respect to the 
texts comprising the corpus, a corpus can be either general, a “corpus of 
texts of many types,” or specialized, a “corpus of texts of a particular 
type.”200  The Westlaw SCT database is specialized, comprising only 
U.S. Supreme Court opinions and orders, whereas the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA) is general.201  With respect to 
the time period the stored texts reflect, a corpus can be either static, fixed 
in content from a given year or span of years, or dynamic, also known as 
                                                          
 194.   Bonelli, supra note 33, at 18–19.  
 195.   HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 2; see also KENNEDY, supra note 192, at 1 (“In the language 
sciences a corpus is a body of written text or transcribed speech which can serve as a basis for 
linguistic analysis and description.”). 
 196.   KENNEDY, supra note 192, at 5. 
 197.   HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 2. 
 198.   Id. 
 199.   Id. 
 200.   Id. at 14; see also KENNEDY, supra note 192, at 19–20 (contrasting general and specialized 
corpora). 
 201.   Solan & Gales, supra note 189, at 4 (“In the past two decades, large corpora of general 
American English have been made available to the public as a research tool.  The most prominent 
have been developed by linguistic researchers at Brigham Young University[, including] the Corpus 
of Contemporary American English (COCA) . . . .”); Search, CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN ENGLISH, http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ (“The Corpus of Contemporary American English 
(COCA) is the largest freely-available corpus of English, and the only large and balanced corpus of 
American English. . . . The corpus contains more than 520 million words of text (20 million words 
each year 1990-2015) and it is equally divided among spoken, fiction, popular magazines, 
newspapers, and academic texts.”) (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
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a monitor corpus, receiving new texts on an ongoing basis to reflect 
ongoing usage change.202  The Helsinki Corpus, for example, is static, 
“consist[ing] of texts from 700 [c.e.] to 1700 [c.e.]”;203 whereas the 
Westlaw SCT database is dynamic, growing each time the Supreme 
Court issues another opinion or order.  Finally, with respect to the 
processing of texts for further analysis, a corpus can be either tagged, 
“refer[ring] to the addition of a code to each word in a corpus, indicating 
the part of speech,”204 or raw, “contain[ing] a minimum of 
annotations.”205  Part-of-speech tags enable some of the more 
illuminating analyses that corpus linguistics provides,206 and it is 
precisely this tagging that is absent from the tools lawyers commonly 
use: “Westlaw or Google are essentially raw corpora,”207 having neither 
part-of-speech tags nor the analytical tools that depend on them.  More 
pertinent here, although Westlaw has a corpus of the texts of issued U.S. 
patents and published U.S. patent applications—called the “United States 
Patents & Applications” database—it does not tag the words in these 
texts for parts of speech.  If, for example, one wanted to analyze how 
U.S. patents issued in 2016 use the word light in the Abstract portion of 
the patent,208 one could retrieve all the issued U.S. patents that contain 
the string “light” in their respective Abstracts (using the search query < 
ISSUEDATE(aft 12-31-2015 & bef 01-01-2017) & ABSTRACT(light) 
>).  There are 17,253 such patents.209  To group the uses of light as a 
noun (as in U.S. Patent No. 9,341,321, which refers to an “assembly 
[that] includes a light source and a lens”) separately from the uses of 
light as a verb (as in U.S. Patent No. 9,255,677, which refers to “a first 
beam of light that primarily lights up a first portion”), one must sort the 
                                                          
 202.   HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 16; KENNEDY, supra note 192, at 22, 60–62. 
 203.   HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 16; KENNEDY, supra note 192, at 38 (discussing the Helsinki 
Corpus). 
 204.   HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 18. 
 205.   KENNEDY, supra note 192, at 21. 
 206.   See HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 18–19, 80–83 (providing example analyses and findings 
that depend upon using a tagged corpus). 
 207.   Phillips et al., supra note 190, at 24. 
 208.   A patent applicant must provide an Abstract, which summarizes “the technical disclosure 
in the [patent] specification . . . as concise[ly] as the disclosure permits,” in order “to enable the 
[Patent] Office and the public generally to determine quickly from a cursory inspection the nature 
and gist of the technical disclosure.”  37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b) (2016). 
 209.   U.S. Patents Issued in 2016 That Use the Word Light, WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com 
(follow “Intellectual Property” hyperlink, then “Patents & Applications” hyperlink, and then “United 
States Patents & Applications” hyperlink and search < ISSUEDATE(aft 12-31-2015 & bef 01-01-
2017) & ABSTRACT(light) >). 
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flagged texts manually.  Traditional corpus analysis tools, by contrast, 
automate the task.210 
Again, corpora are designed not to store texts for later reading (as 
does an archive or library), but to extract data across the range of texts, 
thus providing far richer, more reliable descriptions of semantic usage.  
“[T]he main argument in favour of using a corpus,” Professor Hunston 
urges, “is that it is a more reliable guide to language use than native 
speaker intuition is.”211  Popular corpus linguistics tools thus “process 
data from a corpus in three [main] ways: showing frequency, 
phraseology, and collocation.”212 
Frequency data can help one compare usage of both different words 
or phrases within a corpus and of the same words or phrases across 
corpora, as well as describe changes in relative frequency of usage over 
time.213  For example, using the Google Ngram viewer, one can use the 
wildcard query term, *, to see that in the American English corpus of 
books, the five most common 1-grams214 in the decade spanning 1999 to 
2008, inclusive, are—in descending order—the (around 4.4% of all 1-
grams in the corpus, by year), of (around 2.6% of all the 1-grams), and 
(around 2.3% of all the 1-grams), to (around 2.0% of all the 1-grams), 
and a (around 1.5% of all the 1-grams).  These results are quite 
consistent with top word counts for general English language corpora.215  
With the wildcard term, the Google Ngram viewer shows the ten most 
common items.  Figure 1, below, graphs the search just described.  The 
usage frequencies are stable over the decade. 
                                                          
 210.   See, e.g., HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 81 (contrasting the common collocates of the verb 
light from those of the noun light and the adjective light).  
 211.   Id. at 20. 
 212.   Id. at 3. 
 213.   See id. at 3–9 (discussing use of frequency data and examples); KENNEDY, supra note 192, 
at 97–107 (same). 
 214.   “A 1-gram is a string of characters uninterrupted by a space . . . .”  Michel et al., supra 
note 192, at 176.  A 1-gram can be a word, such as light, or a typo, such as lihgt.  Id.  “An n-gram is 
a sequence of 1-grams, such as the phrase[] ‘stock market’ (a 2-gram) . . . .”  Id. 
 215.   See HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 4 (table 1.1); KENNEDY, supra note 192, at 98 (table 
3.3). 
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Figure 1. Ten most common 1-grams, 1999-2008, American English 
corpus 
 
Contrast the stability of the most common English words to sharp 
turns in usage.  For example, consider Justice Holmes’ opinion rejecting 
a First Amendment challenge to criminalizing the distribution of 
Socialist party leaflets, Schenck v. United States.216  The case is famed 
for establishing a “clear and present danger” test.217  The Ngram viewer 
plot for the 3-gram [adjective] and present, for the period from 1808 to 
2008, shows that the most common such phrase in the American English 
corpus is past and present, for two centuries.  (See Figure 2, below.)  But 
in the 1930s, the phrase clear and present surges up, peaking in 1966.  
Could this be the influence of Schenck’s clear and present danger test?  
The Ngram viewer plot for the 4-gram clear and present [word] is highly 
suggestive.  (See Figure 3, below.)  The most common target 4-gram in 
the corpus, by far, is clear and present danger, which appears from 
nowhere at around the same time as Schenck, in 1919, and surges up 
from the late 1930s through the 1950s.  It has the same mid-1960s peak.  
Usage frequency can take sudden turns, as this example illustrates. 
 
                                                          
 216.   249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 217.   Id. at 52 (“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”) (emphasis added).  On the case and 
its legacy, see Mark Tushnet, The Hughes Court and Radical Political Dissent: The Cases of Dirk 
De Jonge and Angelo Herndon, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 333, 334–36 (2012). 
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Figure 2. Ten most common 3-grams of the form [adjective] and 
present, 1808-2008, American English corpus 
 
Figure 3. Ten most common 4-grams of the form clear and present 
[word], 1908-2008, American English corpus 
 
One can also analyze a corpus using concordance lines, which reveal 
common phraseology.218  “A concordance is a formatted version or 
display of all the occurrences or tokens of a particular type in a 
corpus.”219  Much like a summary list of hits in a Westlaw search, which 
shows the target word or phrase with some surrounding text, a set of 
concordance lines shows the target item in context, pulling hits from 
texts within the corpus.220  The most common concordance-line format is 
known as KWIC, for Key Word In Context, which “has the keyword in 
                                                          
 218.   See HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 9–12, 38–66 (discussing concordance analysis). 
 219.   KENNEDY, supra note 192, at 247. 
 220.   Id. at 251. 
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the centre of the line . . . but with more context [on] each side of the 
keyword.”221  Figure 4, below, shows some concordance lines for the 
phrase clear and present in the COCA, with the context words to the 
right of the phrase listed in alphabetical order.  The high frequency of the 
word danger as the next in line is unmistakable in this corpus, just as it is 
in the Google Ngram viewer. 
 
Figure 4. Concordance lines for clear and present 
 
The phrase clear and present danger also illustrates the third 
analytical tool common in corpus linguistics—namely, collocation, “a 
tendency to occur in the company of other words in certain contexts, e.g. 
pouring rain, statistically significant, intrinsic value, strong tendency.”222  
In the COCA, for example, the top 40 adjectives that occur within two 
                                                          
 221.   Id. 
 222.   Id. at 108; see also HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 12–13, 68–79 (discussing collocation 
data and analysis). 
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words before danger are shown in Figure 5.  The word real is the top 
collocate, and it appears within two words before danger more than 
twice as often as the second collocate, imminent.  When taken together, 
these three tools—frequency data, KWIC lines, and collocation data—
enable a corpus linguist to describe usage, common and uncommon, with 
far greater precision than one could otherwise achieve.  And it is 
uncommon usage, of course, that can undermine the reasonably certain 
notice that Nautilus requires from patent claims. 
 
Figure 5. Adjectival collocates for the noun danger, within two words 
before 
 
Let us begin, then, with the premise that a patent claim term that 
embodies atypical usage is—absent a bespoke definition—less likely to 
inform the person of skill in the art of the claim’s scope with reasonable 
certainty.  How does it benefit the definiteness inquiry to look to 
evidence rooted in corpus linguistics resources?  If a patent examiner or 
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federal judge is to evaluate how typical, or atypical, a bit of claim 
language is, for a given art at a given time, there are only two choices, 
broadly speaking: Estimate typicality using introspection and intuition, 
or estimate typicality using data about usage patterns in an appropriate 
corpus.  The latter is plainly more reliable, as Professor Hunston 
explains: 
Although a native speaker has experience of very much more language 
than is contained in even the largest corpus, much of that experience 
remains hidden from introspection. . . . 
Intuition is a poor guide to at least four aspects of language: 
collocation, frequency, prosody and phraseology. . . . 
It is almost impossible to be conscious of the relative frequency of 
words, phrases and structures except in very general terms (anyone 
might guess that take is a more frequent verb than disseminate, but it is 
difficult to guess whether fare or fantasy is more frequent[223]). . . . 
Although native speakers can often recognize if a phraseology is 
unusual, articulating the nature of the atypicality may be more 
difficult.224 
The recent Polar Electro case illustrates the benefit to a definiteness 
inquiry that usage evidence from the prior art provides.225  Even so, given 
the fact that the key evidence in the case derived from just ten prior art 
references,226 one could wonder whether the outcome reflects anecdata 
more than it reflects data. 
Patent law cannot yet harness, fully, the sources and methods of 
corpus linguistics.  Current corpora straddle the required evidence: The 
databases of U.S. patents, such as Westlaw’s or Google’s,227 do not have 
tagged content or the analytical tools that presuppose part-of-speech tags; 
and the corpora with tagged content and the analytical tools that use tags, 
such as the Google Ngram viewer or the COCA, do not contain U.S. 
patents.  This shortcoming in existing corpora of U.S. patents is not 
surprising, given that lawyers have not—at least up to now—seen 
themselves as corpus linguists.  “A corpus is always designed for a 
                                                          
 223.   In the Google Ngram viewer’s American English corpus, it turns out that the answer 
depends on the time period as to which one asks.  An Ngram graph is in the Appendix. 
 224.   HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 20–21 (citation omitted). 
 225.   See supra notes 101–11 and accompanying text. 
 226.   Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Polar Electro Oy, 656 F. App’x 1008, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(reporting that “Polar’s expert proffered ten extrinsic prior art patents and text books”). 
 227.   Google’s U.S. patent database is found at https://patents.google.com/. 
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particular purpose, and the type of corpus will depend on its purpose.”228  
Even with the corpora we have now, however, I think we can see clearly 
enough how much more robust our definiteness inquiries would be if we 
had, in effect, a Google Ngram viewer plus Google Patents mash-up. 
Consider, for example, the patent invalidated for indefiniteness in 
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I LLC,229 U.S. Patent No. 
6,887,832.  The Federal Circuit held the asserted claims invalid under its 
pre-Nautilus “insolubly ambiguous” standard.230  The technology in 
question was oil field drilling fluids, and the fatally indefinite claim 
language was the phrase “fragile gel drilling fluid.”231  Because the ’832 
patent’s earliest filing date was December 29, 2000,232 it is 
unquestionably the case that all U.S. patents with issue dates before 
December 29, 1999, are prior art to the ’832 patent.233  How often, in 
patents in this technological field or in patents generally, did the phrase 
fragile gel drilling fluid occur in patent claims, or anywhere in a patent’s 
text?  Westlaw’s patent database can provide us precise counts, both 
among patents in the same Patent Office technology class234 (in this 
instance, Class 507, “Earth boring, well treating, and oil field 
chemistry”235) and among patents in all technology classes.  Table 1, 
below, presents the counts, both for the full 4-gram and for selected 
subparts.  The fact that the phrase fragile gel drilling fluid appeared in no 
prior art U.S. patent claims or patent texts, in Class 507 or in any class, 
could suggest that, at the very least, the phrase is in need of a robust 
explicit definition in the ‘832 patent.  The patentee had, in fact, provided 
                                                          
 228.   HUNSTON, supra note 192, at 14. 
 229.   514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 230.   Id. at 1249–50. 
 231.   Id. at 1246. 
 232.   U.S. Patent No. 6,887,832. 
 233.   See supra note 173; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(2012)). 
 234.   Scholars who conduct empirical patent studies have been critical of the U.S. patent 
classification system, with justification.  See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 435, 472 (2004) (“Because they are designed to assist in narrowly-tailored prior art searches, the 
government’s classifications focus on the functional rather than the conceptual and do so at very low 
levels of abstraction.”).  “When a researcher works with an extremely large dataset such that it is not 
feasible to study each patent in depth,” however, “reliance on PTO classifications or International 
Patent Classifications (IPCs, which the PTO assigns from a concordance based on the PTO’s own 
classifications) may be an unavoidable shortcut.”  John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How 
Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 633 n.74 (2016).  The 
searches I do here certainly query “an extremely large dataset.” 
 235.   Class Numbers and Titles, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/ 
classification/selectnumwithtitle.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
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a definition,236 but the Federal Circuit concluded that the definition in the 
body of the ’832 patent did not actually make the claims sufficiently 
clear in scope.237  Had the drafter of the ’832 patent, or the Patent Office 
during the examination process, had before it data of the form that Table 
1 provides, perhaps the explicit definition provided in the ’832 patent 
would have gone to greater lengths to delineate claim scope clearly.  (I 
say “perhaps” to concede that hindsight may color one’s view of these 
data.238) 
 
Table 1. Frequency of fragile gel drilling fluid in U.S. patents issued 
before Dec. 29, 1999 
In Class 507/! Claim Anywhere 
fragile gel drilling fluid 0 0 
fragile gel drilling 0 0 
fragile gel 0 2 
fragile 8 139 
gel 370 2297 
drilling fluid 735 1226 
comprising! or consisting!239 13,997  
In All Classes Claim Anywhere 
fragile gel drilling fluid 0 0 
fragile gel 5 66 
drilling fluid 3555 340,239 
comprising! or consisting! 5,330,729  
And consider, in addition, what we might learn if we could 
interrogate a Google Ngram viewer-style corpus of U.S. patents from the 
relevant time period, either from the same technology class or from all 
technologies.  Parts of speech would be tagged, and we could use 
wildcard searches to hone in on the adjectives that tend to co-occur with 
the word gel.  We do not have that corpus and associated tools, so far as I 
                                                          
 236.   Halliburton, 514 F.3d at 1246–47. 
 237.   Id. at 1256 (“Halliburton’s proposed definition of that term is not sufficiently definite 
because it does not adequately distinguish the fragileness of the invention from disclosed prior art, it 
is ambiguous as to whether an upper bound of fragileness is contemplated, and it is ambiguous as to 
its requisite ability to suspend drill cuttings.”). 
 238.   See supra note 170. 
 239.   This query is reported because it provides a proxy for the total number of patents in the 
group searched, which can serve as a rough denominator for estimating frequency.  The search term 
tracks the number of patents because the words comprising and consisting are the two standard 
transition words that patent writers use to connect a claim’s preamble (or introductory portion) with 
its body (or main portion).  See MUELLER, supra note 4, at 113–20 (explaining the basic “anatomy” 
of a U.S. patent claim). 
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am aware.  We can, however, use the existing Google Ngram viewer to 
make queries that help us appreciate how such data could help ground an 
exhaustive, objective definiteness inquiry.  For example, taking a six-
decade snapshot ending in 1999, the American English corpus contains 
the phrase fragile gel, but infrequently: at its highest point in the graph in 
Figure 6 (which was in 1994), it was 0.0000001020% of all 2-grams in 
the corpus.  How does fragile fare among all adjectives immediately 
preceding gel in the corpus?  It does not appear among the ten most 
common adjectives in the [adjective] gel 2-gram, which are shown in 
Figure 7 below.  And when plotted alongside the frequency line for the 
sum of all [adjective] gel 2-grams, in Figure 8 below, fragile gel 
effectively flatlines at zero.  Had an analysis of a U.S. patents corpus 
produced frequency data along these lines, the great caution suggested by 
the counts in Table 1, above, would be greater still. 
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Figure 7. Ten most common 2-grams of the form [adjective] gel, 
1939-1999, American English corpus 
 
Figure 8. Frequencies of fragile gel and *_ADJ gel, 1939-1999, 
American English Corpus 
 
The frequency data pertaining to the Nautilus case tell a different 
story.  In Nautilus, the challenged patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,337,753, 
used the claim term “in spaced relationship with each other” to refer to 
the spacing of electrodes on a handle that served as a heart monitor.240  
The Supreme Court did not adjudicate the indefiniteness defense on the 
merits, preferring to send the case back to the Federal Circuit for 
application of the new “reasonable certainty” standard in the first 
                                                          
 240.   Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2125–27 (2014). 
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instance.241  On remand, the Federal Circuit, applying the new standard, 
held—as it had before—that the spaced relationship term in the ’753 
patent did not render the claims fatally indefinite.242  Because the ’753 
patent’s earliest filing date was June 9, 1992,243 it is unquestionably the 
case that all U.S. patents with issue dates before June 9, 1991, are prior 
art to the ’753 patent.244  Westlaw’s patent database can provide us 
frequency counts for in spaced relationship with each other and portions 
thereof, both among patents in the same technology class (Class 128, 
“Surgery”245) and among patents in all technology classes.  Table 2, 
below, presents the counts, both in and beyond Class 128, and in and 
beyond the claim language.  In contrast to Halliburton’s fragile gel, the 
spaced relationship of Nautilus does not appear quite so atypical.  These 
data do not raise a bright red flag. 
 
Table 2. Frequency of in spaced relationship with each other in U.S. 
patents issued before June 9, 1991 
In Class 128/! Claim Anywhere 
in spaced relationship with each 
other 
5 44 
in spaced relationship with 44 96 
in spaced relationship 317 638 
spaced relationship 591 1201 
relationship with 1354 3233 
relationship 4467 16,465 
comprising! or consisting!246 66,605  
In All Classes Claim Anywhere 
in spaced relationship with each 
other 
260 560 
in spaced relationship 22,180 287,097 
spaced relationship 40,206 320,763 
comprising! or consisting! 4,483,142  
                                                          
 241.   Id. at 2131 (“As we have explained, the Federal Circuit invoked a standard more 
amorphous than the statutory definiteness requirement allows. We therefore follow our ordinary 
practice of remanding so that the Court of Appeals can reconsider, under the proper standard, 
whether the relevant claims in the ‘753 patent are sufficiently definite.”). 
 242.   Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 243.   U.S. Patent No. 5,337,753. 
 244.   See supra note 173; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(2012)). 
 245.   Class Numbers and Titles, USPTO.GOV, https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/ 
selectnumwithtitle.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). 
 246.   This query is reported because it provides a proxy for the total number of patents in the 
group searched, which can serve as a rough denominator for estimating frequency. 
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The foregoing examples illustrate that corpus linguistics sources and 
methods could provide concrete evidence of demonstrable semantic 
usage in a given art at a given time, greatly improving the reliability of 
definiteness analysis in the Patent Office and in the courts.  There is, in 
addition, a corpus linguistics tool that linguists themselves may not find 
particularly useful, but that the patent law community might very much 
want.  Described functionally, what is needed is a comparator that takes a 
given patent application (or issued patent), identifies the n prior art 
patents that are most semantically similar in content (e.g., the five most 
similar, or the ten most similar), and flags in the target patent the claim 
terms that are the most unlike the claim terms in the prior art batch.  This 
tool would generate, in effect, an indefiniteness heat map of the claim 
terms in a target patent document that merit further attention as 
potentially atypical, and thus potentially unclear, claim text.  Recent 
developments in the use of semantic analysis to situate all existing U.S. 
patents in a similarity space, establishing which patents are most similar 
to which others, may be a large step in the direction I am describing.247  
The Patent Office, for its part, acknowledged two years ago that its own 
semantic comparator tool, known as “PLUS” (for Patent Linguistic 
Utility Service), has arguably fallen behind the functionalities available 
elsewhere.248 
V. CONCLUSION 
To implement the new definiteness standard that Nautilus and Teva 
prescribe, both patent examination and patent litigation should shift 
focus.  The lawyer’s skill in textual exegesis is helpful, but judging 
definiteness requires giving greater weight to robust data about the 
common usage options a patentee had readily available in a given 
technological field at a given time.  Those data, generated with corpus 
                                                          
 247.   See Kenneth A. Younge & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Patent-to-Patent Similarity: A Vector Space 
Model (July 30, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2709238.  This research is 
in use by an entity called the Patent Research Foundation to create “proximity reports”; the entity’s 
website is at https://www.patrf.org, and Messrs. Younge and Kuhn are two of the Foundation’s three 
listed directors.  The Patent Research Foundation, PATRF, https://www.patrf.org/foundation (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2017).  
 248.   Request for Comments on Enhancing Patent Quality, 80 Fed. Reg. 6475 (Feb. 5, 2015) 
(“Given that computerized searching algorithms and database technologies have advanced 
significantly in recent years, the USPTO is seeking input on new tools that might be useful to 
conduct a pre-examination search.  For instance, the new tool might utilize a custom extraction 
routine that enables keyword, stemming, concept-semantic, and relational word searching 
capabilities.  The USPTO’s current pre-examination search tool PLUS does not possess these 
functionalities.  Likewise, the new tool might employ more modern natural language search queries, 
which PLUS also cannot do.”). 
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linguistics tools, provide the context within which to judge the language 
the patentee actually did choose. 
How can one bring about this change of focus?  The Patent Office, 
for its part, should make concerted efforts to develop corpus linguistics 
tools for use during examination.  The goal should be to flag, in every 
application, all claim words and phrases that render the claim language 
atypical for that art, given the prior art U.S. patents and published 
applications with which one can compare it.  The Patent Office tools 
should also be made readily available to potential applicants, who can 
use them to help avoid from the outset at least some share of indefinite 
claim language. 
Private firms that have numerous, extensive interactions with the 
patent system, and who also have both expertise in computer science and 
substantial economic resources—Apple, Google, IBM, Microsoft, and 
others—should also help drive change.  These firms, singly or as a 
group, should establish projects and prizes for computer scientists, 
linguists, or others who successfully create corpora and corpus linguistics 
tools that are tailored to enhance patent claim definiteness analysis.  
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Appendix 
Relative frequencies of fare and fantasy, 1908-2008, American 
English corpus 
  
